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Foreword
Many studies like the IPC Rapid Social Impact Assessment (SIA)1 have been done after Ondoy (Ketsana) and
Pepeng (Parma) devastated many vulnerable communities in Metro Manila and Northern Luzon in SeptemberOctober 2009. Two years later, the IPC Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study allows us a glimpse of how
the urban and rural poor households have survived the hazards posed by storms, typhoons, floods and other
climate change-related effects.
Conducted in 21 communities in Metro Manila and Luzon, the study provides very rich and highly textured
data regarding the socio-economic and political conditions of urban and rural poor communities. It also
provides us a glimpse of the various paths that they have pursued over the past two years from disaster to
recovery. The report gives insightful assessments of the short- and long-term impacts of the disaster and the
implementation and effectiveness of the disaster response programs of both government and civil society
organizations (CSOs). It enriches our spirit with narratives about how the poor tried to deal with their trauma
and fears amid limited institutional aid/support, their attempts in recovering their losses and their hopes for
building a better future. It weaves a rich tapestry of the stories of the men, women, and children their
psychological responses and household coping mechanisms for livelihood and survival after the onslaughts of
Ondoy/Pepeng.
The findings and insights of this study can be very useful for LGUs and CSOs formulating and/or refining
their local disaster risk reduction management plans and programs. These plans and programs will refine
further reconstruction efforts in both urban and rural areas and possibly, the development of a more effective
urban renewal strategy. In constructing effective management plans and programs, local officials and leaders
need to construct vulnerability and capacity profiles of their constituents. They need to identify, among
others, 1) the ecological, socio-economic and political locations of the poor, 2) the level of vulnerability of
their economic activities and livelihood bases to climate change-related hazards/risks, and 3) the sociopolitical and cultural adaptation patterns devised by the poor in response to disasters.
Finally, this study serves as another milestone in IPC‘s institutional journey as a knowledge producer and
broker to support the efforts of NGOs/POs, government agencies and multilateral agencies in crafting
responsive community disaster planning and programming.

Emma Porio, PhD
Livable Cities, Sustainable Communities Research and Advocacy Program
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Ateneo de Manila University

1 This

became part of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) prepared by the Government of the Philippines in partnership with the World
Bank, UN agencies, other international development partners and representatives of the private sector and civil society organizations.

Page 3 of 80

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research team at the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) that prepared this Social Impact Monitoring
study was led by Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu (Project Director), Maria Elissa Jayme Lao (Project Manager –
Rural) and Angela Desiree Aguirre (Project Manager – Urban), and comprised of Randy Solis, Nicole
Ocampo, Yasmin Pimentel, Henrietta Aguirre, Diana Jean Moraleda, Candy Lachica-Hidalgo, Mary Grace
Joyce Alis, Cora Bolong, Felicidad Corpus, Nonita Adan-Perez, Lorraine Mangaser, Aileen Rose Jimenez,
Vanessa Rachel Rivera, Maria Nouelle Ann Cezar, Anna Fatima Joven, Isabel Maria Camus, Brian Paul A.
Giron, Arjan P. Aguirre, Cherry Lumidao, Sofia Ligawen, Angela Juan, Brian Rillorta Flores, Susie Abadey
Bangles-Baldo, farland Dao-ayan Valera, Liberty L. Catbagan, Jocelyn Alimondo, Cherry Gatiw-an, Alicia T.
Pingol, Raquel Ricalde, Celerina Bartolome and Matthew Alonsozana.
The IPC team would like to thank all the Local Government Units, particularly the MWSDOs in the study
sites, the NGO-POs which participated in the study, and especially all the community members who took the
time to share their experiences in the 19 months after Ondoy and Pepeng.
In the process of refining this study, the team acknowledges the invaluable assistance provided by the Dr.
Mary Racelis and the reference group members from the following institutions: Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Department of Interior and Local Government, National Housing Authority,
Office of Civil Defense, CO Multiversity, PHILSSA, Urban Poor Associates, and UP College of Social Work
and Development.
The team would also like to acknowledge staff from the World Bank‘s social development team in the
Philippines, Patricia Fernandes, Matthew Stephens and Maria Loreto Padua, who provided technical
assistance, as well as the assistance provided by Erika Montero Geronimo, Reyna Reyes and Anne Orquiza at
AusAID.
The views and opinions expressed in the report are solely those of the research team from the Institute of
Philippine Culture.

Page 4 of 80

ACRONYMS

AFPSLAI
AKAP
AusAID
BDRRMC
CARD
CIDSS
CSFI
CSWDO
DPWH
DRMMC
DSWD
DTI
DVD
FGD
GK
GSIS
IPC
KII
KV1
LGU
MBA
MDRRMC
MFI
MSO
MSWDO
NAWASA
NDCC
NGOs
NHA
OSY
4Ps
PAG-IBIG
PCSO
PDNA
PhilSSA
RA
SACDECO
SEA-K
SIA
SIM
TESDA
TSPI
TV
UNICEF
UPAO
UP PLANADES
WBF

Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
Alay sa Kapatid Foundation
Australian Agency for International Development
Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Center for Agriculture and Rural Development, Inc.
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
Congressional Spouses Foundation, Inc.
City Social Welfare Development Officer
Department of Public Works and Highways
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils
Department of Social Welfare and Development
Department of Trade and Industry
Digital Video Disk
Focus Group Discussion
Gawad Kalinga
Government Social Insurance System
Institute of Philippine Culture
Key Informant Interview
Kasiglahan Village
Local Government Unit
Mutual Benefit Association
Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council
Microfinance institutions
Marikina Settlements Office
Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer
National Water And Sewerage Authority
National Disaster Coordinating Council
Non-Government Organizations
National Housing Authority
Out-of-School-Youths
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
Pagtutulungan sa Kinabukasan: Ikaw, Bangko Industriya at Gobyerno
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
Partnership of Philippine Support Services Agencies, Inc.
Republic Act
Sta. Cruz Credit and Development Cooperative
Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran
Social Impacts Assessment
Social Impacts Monitoring
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
Tulay sa Pag-unlad Incorporated
Television
United Nations Children's Fund
Urban Poor Affairs Office
UP Planning and Development Research Foundation, Inc.
West Bank, Floodway

Page 5 of 80

Contents

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................................... 3
ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................... 7
2. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 13
2.1
Research themes and site selection .............................................................................................................. 13
Table 1: Focus areas and data sets ....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 2: Research sites ............................................................................................................................................ 15
Figure 1: Map of study sites ................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 3: Distribution of key informants .............................................................................................................. 16
2.2 What do we mean when we talk about recovery and reconstruction? .......................................................... 17
Figure 2: Community priorities for recovery and reconstruction (number of rural and urban sites) ........ 18
Table 8: Community understanding of recovery and reconstruction ............................................................ 19
3. Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Impact ........................................................................................................... 20
3.1
Long-term impact on household income ................................................................................................... 20
3.2 Limited assistance for livelihood restoration ..................................................................................................... 25
Table 10: Assistance received for livelihood recovery ....................................................................................... 27
3.3. Coping strategies ................................................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 4: Most frequently observed coping strategies (number of sites) ........................................................ 33
Figure 5: ―Beyond sari-sari stores‖ – types of local businesses in research sites........................................... 34
Figure 7: Sources of credit most frequently mentioned in rural and urban areas (number of sites) .......... 37
Figure 8: Micro-finance institutions mentioned by respondents (number of sites) ...................................... 38
3.4 Recommendations from communities ............................................................................................................... 43
Figure 10: Community recommendations on livelihood recovery (number of sites) ................................... 43
4. Social Relations and Cohesion ............................................................................................................................... 44
4.1
Changes in intra-household relationships ................................................................................................... 44
Table 12: Self-employment, predominantly male and female occupations (average earnings) ................... 45
Figure 11: Youth taking on additional work (number of sites) ........................................................................ 46
4.2 Community cohesion during the recovery phase ............................................................................................. 47
Figure 14: Community-based recovery activities (number of sites, excluding evacuation areas) ............... 48
Figure 13: Community-based recovery activities (number of sites) ................................................................ 48
Figure 15: Sites reporting emerging tensions or increases in crime and violence ......................................... 49
4.3 Community recommendations to improve social cohesion ........................................................................... 51
Figure 16: Community suggestion to improve social cohesion (number of sites) ........................................ 51
Table 13: Security of tenure in research sites ...................................................................................................... 52
5.2
Community views of housing and relocation assistance .......................................................................... 53
5.2.1 Assistance received ......................................................................................................................................... 53
Figure 18: Main sources of assistance (number of sites) ................................................................................... 53
Figure 17: Assistance for housing reconstruction (number of sites) ............................................................... 53
5.2.2 Reluctance to relocate .................................................................................................................................... 54
Figure 19: Communities reluctant to relocate (number of sites)
Figure 20: Concerns regarding relocation (number of sites) ............................................................................ 55
Table 14: Improvement in living conditions (off-city and in-city resettlement)............................................ 57
Access to employment and higher cost of living .................................................................................................... 59
Table 15: Access to livelihoods and social support networks (off-city and in-city resettlement) ............... 59
Limited access to information about resettlement options ................................................................................... 61

Page 6 of 80

Table 16: Gaps in information about the resettlement process (percentage of households) ...................... 62
Deciding whether to stay ............................................................................................................................................ 63
Table 17: Amortization conditions considered affordable (qualitative module) ........................................... 63
5.4 Community recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 64
6.1 Improving the delivery of recovery assistance .................................................................................................. 65
Figure 21: Issues with the delivery of recovery assistance (number of sites) ................................................. 68
6.2 Disaster preparedness ........................................................................................................................................... 70
Figure 22: Improved disaster preparedness (number of sites) ......................................................................... 70
Table 18: Overview of M/BDRRMC establishment in study sites ................................................................. 71
6.3
Community recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 72
7. Conclusions and research team recommendations ................................................................................................. 73
7.1 Main Findings ......................................................................................................................................................... 73
Providing livelihood skills and knowledge of the market ................................................................................. 73
7.2 Suggested Strategies for Change .......................................................................................................................... 76
REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................................. 80
Published/unpublished works ................................................................................................................................... 80
Websites .................................................................................................................................................................... 80

Page 7 of 80

1. Executive Summary
The Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study provides an overview of the long term social
impacts of typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng, which hit the Philippines in 2009. It builds on the initial
analysis of the social impacts on affected communities carried out in the immediate aftermath of the
disasters. Data was collected in a total of 21 sites in four cities in Metro Manila and nine provinces in
Luzon. In addition to the qualitative analysis carried out in 19 sites (nine urban and ten rural areas), a
short survey was conducted in two additional communities (Eusebio Bliss and Southville 5A). This
enabled the research team to collect information on the living conditions of communities resettled post
Ondoy/Pepeng. The data obtained enabled the team to compare the outcomes of ―in-city‖ (Eusebio
Bliss) and ―off-city‖ (Southville 5A) resettlement.
Ensuring that research questions and recommendations feed into policy discussions on
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management as well as on the Metro Manila Urban Renewal
agenda was an important part of the SIM exercise. A SIM Reference Group comprised of
representatives from government agencies, civil society groups and development partners working on the
issues outlined above was convened. The group‘s inputs were instrumental in: (i) validating and finalizing
research questions, and (ii) assessing the relevance and feasibility of the study‘s recommendations
presented in the final section of this report.
The SIM collected information on the following themes: (i) livelihoods and socio-economic
impacts; (ii) social relations and cohesion, and (iii) resettlement options and housing conditions. Particular
attention was also paid by the research team to understanding coping strategies taken by affected
households, which often included a growing reliance on credit.
Livelihoods
Communities targeted by the study reported an overall reduction in income since 2009.
Sources of income and the types of jobs available have remained the same before and after
Ondoy/Pepeng in all of the sites visited. While sources of income were more diversified in urban areas,
reductions in income in both rural and urban areas were attributed to the loss of assets and capital caused
by the disasters. Wage workers (primarily in urban areas) were the only ―occupational category‖ whom
respondents considered as having fully recovered from the losses caused by the typhoons. For the
remainder (farmers, fishermen, small business owners and informal sector workers), the disaster had long
term impacts. The overall trend observed across research sites had been for available capital to be
diverted away from livelihood activities to meet more urgent housing reconstruction or basic
consumption needs. Affected households, therefore, tended to shift to less capital intensive, less secure
and less profitable occupations. This pattern was observed in rural areas: “ [Ma‟am, my observation is before
Ondoy, most of the people in the neighborhood had farms and planted sayote, but after the typhoon, they lost their farms
and were forced to work in others people‟s farms]”, as well as urban areas: “[Now they have to work as mere vendors,
selling in town stuff they didn‟t make, or work in construction sites. In the past we had our own capital, our own materials;
now even capital we don‟t have].”
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Livelihood assistance was provided to the vast majority of the communities covered in the
study. Within the 20 month period that followed Ondoy and Pepeng, 18 of the 21 areas visited had
received some form of financial assistance. The primary sources of support mentioned by the
respondents were: (i) existing social protection and livelihoods programs implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), (ii) Cash or Food for Work implemented by
local governments in partnership with international development partners, and (iii) emergency grants or
loans (ranging between Php 2,000 and Php 8,000) made available to the most severely affected
households by local governments and civil society organizations.
With the exception of two areas visited, all of the communities considered that the support
they received did not respond to their long-term livelihood recovery needs. The most frequently
mentioned factor behind the inability to resume a profitable livelihood activity was the lack of
capital. The research team systematically observed that funds set aside for livelihood activities were
diverted to cover basic household needs: (i) basic consumption, (ii) medical expenses, and (iii) urgent
housing repairs. Participants in the study also highlighted the importance of ensuring that livelihood
training programs implemented are relevant to their context and local markets. In particular, communities
pointed out that the training provided did not, in the majority of cases, lead to employment or better
livelihood opportunities.
Coping strategies
The most commonly adopted coping strategies were consistent with the trends observed in
2009 and remained: (i) taking on additional or temporary jobs where available; (ii) reducing
consumption, and (iii) taking on multiple loans, including for basic expenditures. Income was found to be
very uncertain, requiring households to be highly opportunistic in pursuing livelihood opportunities. In
spite of the multiple jobs held by household members, however, income remained in most cases
insufficient to cover basic consumption needs.
Reducing the number of meals and the quality of the food consumed was observed in all
urban sites, without exception. Significantly, only half of rural communities explicitly referred to
reduced food in-take as a coping strategy. Close ties with neighbors and the ability to grow food for
home consumption were the main reasons put forward by respondents to explain these patterns. As
observed in 2009, children continued to go to school without an allowance to purchase food. The
household budget could often not cover both the cost of transportation and of food. While removing
children from school was seen as a last resort, the number of sites where households reported they could
no longer afford schooling expenses increased from 2009 to 2011, as did the instances of children
working.
Access to credit and levels of debt
Financial support from relatives continued to be rare in line with the research‟s team 2009
findings. The practice of borrowing from multiple sources seems to have intensified in all
research areas. Overall, sources of credit have remained the same with only slight variations across
rural and urban areas. While Micro-Finance Institutions were marginally more prevalent in urban areas,
informal lenders were more frequently mentioned as sources of loans in rural areas. In addition, no
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significant changes were noted in lending terms. In 17 of the sites visited, interest rates have remained the
same for both formal and informal lending sources.
While credit continued to be available, respondents systematically reported that their level of
indebtedness had increased. Reports of at least some households with unpaid debts were found across
all 19 sites. Significant delays in making payments were noted in over half of the areas visited. In addition,
the inability to repay outstanding debt led to the loss of assets in urban and rural areas. While the practice
of borrowing from multiple sources (“puhunan”) was a coping mechanism pre-dating the 2009 disasters,
respondents indicated that the practice had intensified. It was reported in more than half of the sites
visited: “ Usually, those who borrow, do not borrow just from one source. If you borrow Php 2,000 from one source, Php
5,000 from the other, sometimes they all just add up and with the problem of not being able to borrow…because what you
earn is not enough” […] “While this has long been the practice, it is more aggressive today. In fact, many take this option
now.”
Social relations and cohesion
The general perception of communities consulted during the SIM was that the gender
division of labor had returned to its pre-Ondoy situation. The SIM further indicated that households
were increasingly reliant on the income generate by small businesses and temporary work, primarily
undertaken by women. The research team found a clear concentration of women in a more restricted
number of occupations. These were also typically lower paid jobs and less skilled jobs. Women were also
more commonly drawn to home-based activities that would enable them to continue performing
domestic tasks. The research team encountered isolated instances where the disaster response seemed to
encourage greater engagement by women in community activities.
The research team encountered a widespread sense in targeted communities that youth were
making significant contributions to the recovery effort. Young people contributed more to
household budgets by taking on temporary work. This was accompanied by a change in communities‘
perception of the role of young people, now considered more trustworthy. This perception did not,
however, translate into greater voice for youth in decision-making at the household or the community
level.
The analysis conducted in 2009 indicated that collaborative behavior was widespread among
affected communities. Overall, instances of community-level recovery activities were rarer
during the SIM. Informants systematically reported that after the initial rehabilitation efforts,
community members provided support almost exclusively to their extended family. These close-knit
networks were important in providing information about recovery programs and sources of support.
They replaced the broader community as the main focus of collaborative behavior. Where instances of
community-wide support mechanisms were observed, informants reported they had already been strong
prior to the disasters. This was primarily observed in rural and peri-urban areas.
Increased tensions within the community and greater levels of insecurity were observed in a
reduced number of sites, mostly urban. Overall, relationships within villages and urban
neighborhoods remained positive. In communities with a significant number of new settlers there was a
tendency to attribute law and order problems to ―new-comers‖, informal settlers or neighboring
communities. Where an increase in crime and violence was noted, respondents indicated links to the
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difficult post-disaster economic situation. Respondents considered that youth were the group at greater
risk.
Resettlement options and housing conditions
Reports from communities on the provision of housing assistance were mixed. In kind and
cash assistance had been provided to all significantly affected sites. However, participants systematically
reported that assistance had not been sufficient to meet the needs of all affected households within these
communities. Respondents also highlighted the delays between the initial needs assessment and the
provision of assistance: “ Here people went from house to house and checked the damage of the house and the capacity of
the owner to repair it. But they just did interviews. I saw no help coming in here in our place. We just thought we probably
didn‟t qualify but if you look [you will see that] the houses of our neighbors were totally wrecked. But nothing […] they
took photos and then nothing […] A year has passed and then nothing. Until it was my neighbors themselves who took
care of the repairs. Because they couldn‟t wait anymore.”
Residents in two study sites, Botolan in Zambales and Tublay in Benguet, remained in
temporary shelter two years after they were moved from their homes. Feedback from residents
revealed how living conditions and access to services had deteriorated over time in these areas. Residents
attributed their stalled recovery to difficulties in securing a suitable resettlement site and to slow progress
with the needed construction work for new developments.
The qualitative research module indicated that communities in 12 study sites were reluctant
to resettle in areas outside their barangay. The main reason for this was the risk of not being able to
find a suitable livelihood in the resettlement areas. Fears of losing their current social support
mechanisms were also critical, followed by concerns about access to services in resettlement areas and
about risks in proposed resettlement areas.
The short surveys conducted in Southville 5A (off-city resettlement area), and Eusebio Bliss
(in-city resettlement) enabled the research team to compare living conditions and gain a sense of
the impact of these two approaches on the welfare of resettled households. Overall, respondents
from both areas reported an improvement in living conditions: (i) better housing, (ii) improved access to
safe sanitation, electricity, and garbage disposal. Access to piped water constituted a significant exception
and was considerably lower for resettled households in both sites. Access to livelihoods remained a
challenge for resettled households. Negative impacts were, however, stronger in the off-city resettlement
area (Southville 5A), where two out of three households reported a decrease in income. Those resettled
off-city also experienced increased expenditures, particularly in transport costs to get to jobs and to
school.
In addition, there were certain social costs associated with resettlement. Household living
arrangements changed significantly for those resettled off-city. While the vast majority of households
lived together prior to resettlement (93%), only 63% did so after resettlement in Southville 5A. In
contrast no such changes were observed for those resettled in-city (Eusebio Bliss). Resettlement has also
had an impact on households´ ability to ask for assistance from informal networks. Again, the impact was
strongest for households resettled off-city, with a third of households in Southville 5A reporting
difficulties in finding assistance for their daily needs.
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Data collected through the SIM (from both the qualitative and quantitative modules)
indicated that information regarding resettlement was inadequate or unavailable during the
relocation and resettlement of affected households. A significant proportion of those resettled did
not have access to critical information on: (i) the location of the resettlement site, and (ii) on the cost of
housing and payment schemes. Given the lack of information about the resettlement process, it was,
therefore, significant that a large proportion of households attributed their decision to relocate primarily
to the local government unit.
A still significant proportion of households in both Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss were
considering leaving their current place of residence (26% in Southville 5A and 39% in Eusebio
Bliss). For those resettled off-city the main reason put forward was the limited access to employment.
For households resettled in-city, the main concern was the difficulties in making payments on their
housing units.
Local governance and recovery
Communities systematically highlighted the role played by the Municipal Social Welfare
Development Officer (MSWDO) during both the relief and recovery phases. Being able to rely on
community-based organizations and local leaders was essential for the implementation of recovery
activities. Sites where respondents were satisfied with the distribution of recovery assistance tended to
have put in place targeting systems that involved barangay and municipal city officers in collaboration
with civil society or community-based organizations.
In nine of the study sites visited, respondents said that the system put in place for the
provision of recovery assistance had led to inequitable outcomes. In these areas, participants
indicated that certain sub-groups in the community had been excluded. The communities believed that
most of these gaps in the provision of assistance were not politically motivated. The research team did,
however, find a number of instances where the grant of recovery assistance was highly personalized (i.e.
direct cash or in kind assistance given by local government officials).
Lack of information both about the targeting process and about the existing sources of
assistance were consistently observed. Respondents often considered that differences in access to
information partly explained the uneven distribution of support. Communities also highlighted a
―monopoly of knowledge‖ by community leaders.
Barangay and community level disaster preparedness measures need further strengthening.
The research team noted uneven progress with the roll-out of the Municipal and Barangay Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Councils. While the research team observed greater awareness of the disaster
risks in targeted areas, there were few community-based disaster prevention initiatives in place. These
were observed in four of the sites visited and had limited linkages to wider city or municipal level
activities.
Recommendations from communities
One of the key findings from the discussions with communities was that the livelihood
support provided was often unsustainable. The availability of capital was the key ―missing element‖
in recovery according to respondents.
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Respondents highlighted the need to improve communication among sub-groups within
their communities. A number of suggestions were put forward, primarily from urban areas, of activities
that could promote greater civic engagement and improve security within targeted neighborhoods.
Except for the higher amortization rates, communities considered in-city resettlement as the
best option to: (i) enable households to retain access to livelihood and employment opportunities; (ii)
minimize disruptions to essential social support networks. Where ―in-city‖ resettlement was not a viable
option, communities highlighted the importance of: (i) ensuring that basic services are available in new
development sites, and (ii) to promoting access to sustainable livelihoods.
Both urban and rural communities focused on the importance of strengthening local disaster
preparedness activities with a focus on the following: (i) acquisition of basic material and equipment
of relief operations; (ii) implementation of disaster preparedness training to cover the broader community
(and not only local officials), and (iii) putting in place a local system for relief and recovery operations
(considered lacking in the majority of the areas visited).
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2. Introduction
2.1 Research themes and site selection

The Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study of communities and households adversely affected
by Ondoy and Pepeng in 2009 provides an overview of their recovery and of the long term social
impacts of these disasters. The SIM builds on the initial analysis of the social impacts carried out in the
immediate aftermath of the typhoons1 and focuses on the following central themes of: (i) livelihoods and
socio-economic adaptations (including an analysis of indebtedness); (ii) social relations; (iii) local governance,
and (iv) resettlement and relocation (please see Table 1 for additional details). The insights provided by the
study are intended to inform reconstruction efforts with a particular focus on the Metro Manila urban
renewal strategy.
Table 1: Focus areas and data sets
Focus areas
Livelihoods and
socioeconomic
adaptations

Data sets
Socioeconomic impacts
 Employment and livelihood (re-establishment, new opportunities, loss of employment
and/or income)
 Alternative/complementary sources of income
 Changes in intra-household allocation of resources
 Recovery of productive assets (focus on small/home-based businesses)
 Coping strategies
 Contributions to family care and income
 Changes in access to basic services (disruption and re-establishment of access)
 Sources of recovery assistance and support (government programs, civil
society/private sector interventions, family support, including domestic/foreign
remittances)
 Credit needs and changes in uses

The SIA was conducted in the aftermath of Ondoy, which hit the Philippines on September 26, 2009, causing widespread flooding
in Metro Manila and surrounding areas, and Pepeng which affected, in particular, Central and Northern Luzon from October 3 to 9,
2009. The Institute of Philippine Culture conducted the assessment of the social impact of Ondoy on urban poor communities in
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Laguna. The full text of the report can be found at http://pdf.ph/downloads/PDNA/PDNASocial_Impact_Assessment_FINAL_20100725.pdf. A team from the World Bank and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development conducted the social impact assessment of peri-urban and urban communities affected by Pepeng. Both studies were
conducted in November 2009. A summary of both reports was included in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)
commissioned by the Government of the Philippines in November 2009. The PDNA text can be accessed using the following link
http://www.worldbank.org.ph/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/PHILIPPINESEXTN/0,,conte
ntMDK:22405100~menuPK:3968175~pagePK:64027988~piPK:64027986~theSitePK:332982,00.html
1
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Focus areas

Data sets
Access to credit and indebtedness

Social relations

Local
governance






Sources of credit (formal and informal, changes in availability of credit)
Conditions of loans (changes in rates, re-payment periods, collateral)
Ability to repay and consequences of defaulting
Savings





Changes in gender and intergenerational relations
Social support networks, family-based, community-based, or otherwise
Community mobilization and response in the reconstruction phase (role of
community associations and instances of collective action)
Sources of conflict within the communities in the recovery and reconstruction phase
Response/assistance given to affected communities/individuals by national
government agencies and city/municipality/barangay LGU
Forms/modes of response/assistance/help rendered when, how, to which
communities/groups/individuals in the community
Exclusion of particular groups from reconstruction support (or perception of
inequitable distribution of benefits)
Quality of response
Sustainability of response
Problems, concerns, issues
Community recommendations on how to improve recovery and reconstruction
efforts; role of (i) government, (ii) civil society, and (iii) community
Current housing conditions
Changes in residence (location, living arrangements – sharing, renting, alternative
living arrangements for other family members)
Share of income spent on housing/rent, ability to pay and consequences of defaulting
Recovery assistance received for loss of housing/damage to housing (source of
support, adequacy, and equity)
Perception of risk of further disasters in current location
Impact of resettlement/relocation intervention on access to basic services, and access
to employment and livelihoods (income)










Resettlement
and Relocation
(“in-city” and
“off-city”)








Data was collected in a total of 21 sites in four cities in Metro Manila and nine provinces in
Luzon. Qualitative research was undertaken in the same 18 sites studied in the 2009 SIA (eight urban
and ten rural/peri-urban communities). In addition, the SIM qualitative module also covered Taguig City,
where a social impacts assessment had been carried out in 2009 by an AusAID team. Finally, quantitative data
was collected from Southville 5A (Biñan, Laguna) in Eusébio Bliss (Maybunga, Pasig). These two sites were
selected to provide insights into the living conditions of communities resettled post-Ondoy/Pepeng. In
particular, the information obtained helped to compare the outcomes of ―in-city‖ (Eusebio Bliss) and ―offcity‖ (Southville 5A) resettlement.
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Table 2: Research sites

Research
method
Qualitative

Urban

Rural and peri-urban

1. Barangay Malaban, Biñan City, Laguna
2. Southville 4, Barangay Caingin and
Barangay Pooc, Santa Rosa City, Laguna
3. Gawad Kalinga Camacho Phase II, Nangka,
Marikina City
4. Barangay Caudillo, Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija
5. Barangay Sapang Buho, Palayan City,
Nueva Ecija
6. Westbank Mangahan Floodway, Maybunga,
Pasig City
7. Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City
8. Kasiglahan Village 1, San Jose, Montalban,
Rizal
9. Barangay Wawa, Taguig City

10. Barangay Puguis, La Trinidad, Benguet
11. Barangay Ambassador, Tublay,
Benguet
12. Barangay Poblacion, Baliuag, Bulacan
13. Barangay Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan
14. Barangay Pulong Tamo, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan
15. Barangay Natividad, Naguilian, La
Union
16. Barangay Tabucolan, Santa, Ilocos Sur
17. Barangay East Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan
18. Barangay Longos Central, San Fabian,
Pangasinan
19. Barangay Carael, Botolan, Zambales

Quantitative 20. Eusebio BLISS, Maybunga, Pasig City
21. Southville 5A, Langkiwa, Biñan, Laguna
Figure 1: Map of study sites
The selection of sites was based on the premise
that the pace and quality of recovery will be at least partly
influenced by the following factors: (i) the severity of the
storms‘ impacts (linked to geographical location), and (ii) the
community‘s degree of social cohesion and social capital which
is likely to influence their ability to mobilize resources. The
research team, therefore, looked at a range of settlements
exposed to different types of environmental vulnerability:
coastal, lakeside, riverine and mountainous communities. In
addition, the areas selected provided information on how
recovery progressed in formal versus informal settlements. The
research team focused on the existence or absence of
community organizations as well as on the linkages with groups
and institutions outside of the community. Additional details
on site selection and typology can be found in Annex I.
The SIM used a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies (please
refer to Annex II for additional details). Community walkthroughs and participant observation were used
to gain a fuller understanding of the everyday lives of households affected by Ondoy and Pepeng. A set of
standard Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with
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different sub-groups within selected communities. Separate discussions were systematically held with women
and youth2 with additional interviews carried out with vulnerable households identified by the communities
themselves. In addition, the team also collected the perspectives of national and local government
representatives as well as those of civil society groups. Finally, a short survey was implemented in the two
selected resettlement areas to enable the research team to quantify some of the patterns observed.
Table 3: Distribution of key informants

Unit
Key informants
from the
community
(Number of
communities: 19)
Key informants at
the municipal/city
level
(Number of
communities: 19)
Key informants at
the regional/
national level

Type/Number
In all study sites except Southville 4A, Biñan City, Laguna and Maybunga, Pasig City:
Household with the worst level of vulnerability to Ondoy/Pepeng (1)
Household with high level of indebtedness (1)
Community organization leader (1)
Barangay captain (1)
In Southville 4A, Biñan City, Laguna and Maybunga, Pasig City:
Resettled households (2)
Municipal/city mayor/relocation and resettlement officer of local government
units (1)
Municipal/City Social Welfare Development Officer (MSWDO/CSWDO) (1)
Community organization leader at the city/municipal level (1)

Total
80

Leaders of various urban poor umbrella organizations in Metro Manila
National Housing Authority
Administrator of a government-owned lot partly occupied by informal settlers
Credit providers

8

Total
Ensuring that research questions and recommendations feed into policy discussions on
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management as well as on the Metro Manila Urban Renewal agenda
was an important part of the SIM exercise. A SIM Reference Group comprised of representatives from
government agencies, civil society groups and development partners working on these issues was convened.3
The reference group‘s inputs were instrumental in validating and finalizing the research questions and
approach used by the research team.4 These consultations aimed to ensure that the questions asked during
data collection would generate information relevant to the stakeholders responsible for implementing
different aspects of these two agendas. Secondly, the draft report and key findings were presented in a second
2

Aged between 14 and 18

The Reference Group met on April 4, 2011 and on July 29, 2011. It included representatives from the following offices and groups:
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Interior and Local Government, National Housing Authority,
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Philippine Association of Social Work, Community Organizing
Multiversity, Urban Poor Associates, and Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc. AusAID provided additional
comments in separate consultations.
3

An orientation workshop of field researchers was held on April 14 to 15, 2011 at the IPC, Ateneo de Manila University, and was
attended by 20 of the 29 members of the field research teams. Two separate orientation meetings were conducted in Santa, Ilocos Sur
(for Ilocos Sur field research team), and in Baguio City (for the Benguet/La Union/Pangasinan field research teams) on May 3 to 4,
2011 and May 14, 2011, respectively.
4

57

145
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meeting of the Reference Group. The round of discussions was primarily geared towards assessing the
relevance and feasibility of the SIM‘s recommended strategies for change. It enabled the research team to
further refine the recommendations presented in this report.
The data collection and data analysis activities also included feedback sessions with: (i)
communities that participated in the analysis, and (ii) mayors and municipal councils. These sessions
gave the community and its LGU officials a sense of the data the research team was able to gather and made
officials aware of the expectations of their constituents regarding the recovery process. Finally, they were an
avenue to validate findings and collect additional feedback.
2.2 What do we mean when we talk about recovery and reconstruction?

What communities understood by “recovery” and “reconstruction” differs from the use of these
terms by Government institutions and development practitioners.5 The questions: ―What does recovery
mean to you?‖ and ―What does reconstruction mean to you‖ were asked systematically during FDGs. For
communities, ―recovery‖ implied the restoration of their quality of life to pre-disaster levels.
―Reconstruction‖ was above all understood as the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. Participants in the
study illustrated their understanding of these terms with reference to the support received post-disaster
although the ―self-help‖ dimension of recovery (―sariling sikap‖) was also frequently mentioned.
The elements of recovery and reconstruction that were considered most significant varied across
rural and urban areas. The severity of the disasters‘ impact and the perceived environmental vulnerability
were the two other relevant factors influencing community responses.
The dimension of recovery assistance more frequently mentioned by the participants in the
study was livelihood restoration. In rural communities, the emphasis was on the provision of agricultural
inputs (with seeds and pesticides commonly mentioned), access to capital, and additional training. In urban
areas the focus was on access to jobs and support for small businesses. Capital was considered essential for
recovery across all sites. Informants consistently stated that recovery ―boils down to the money issue‖ (La Trinidad,
Benguet) and referred to overcoming ―the trauma of the pocket” (West Bank Floodway, Pasig). The second
critical element of recovery in both rural and urban areas was housing assistance. This was particularly
true for communities most severely affected and where a permanent resettlement solution had not yet been
found. This was the case in Rosales (Pangasinan) and Botolan (Zambales), where respondents stressed that
recovery meant ―having a place to live.6‖ Given the severity of the disasters‘ impacts in some areas7, recovery
5

Recovery is defined by United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction as: ―The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of
facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.‖
Reconstruction, according to the same source, is typically defined as a sector under the Recovery framework
(http://www.disasterassessment.org/section.asp?ID=22, accessed on June 23, 2011). The recovery task of rehabilitation and
reconstruction begins soon after the emergency phase has ended, and should be based on pre-existing strategies and policies that
facilitate
clear
institutional
responsibilities
for
recovery
action
and
enable
public
participation
(http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf, accessed on June 23, 2011).
This was observed in Botalan (Zambales), Rosales (Pangasinan) and Tublay (Benguet). Similar reactions were observed in Tublay
where some of the residents report still being traumatized by their experiences during the typhoons: “Hay naku! Siya ka ti permi. Haan
kami garud nga makaturog. Uray dagidiay uubing mi, natrauma da kitdi ah.” [Mine is worst (referring to her experience after the typhoons). I
cannot sleep. Even the children experienced trauma.]
7
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from trauma was also raised as significant. Respondents in Rosales defined recovery as: ―when we can sleep
soundly at night again without worrying too much about another impending danger.”
On the other hand, the key dimension of reconstruction highlighted in all sites was
the rehabilitation of infrastructure that would help minimize further damage caused by
disasters. Communities, particularly in rural areas, expressed concern over their ongoing
vulnerability: 8 ―Ngem syak talaga ti kayat ko, rehab kuma ngay idiay ayan mi. Tapno dakami idiay baba, haan
kami nga magaburan, dagiyay ada idiay ngato, haan da nga matinnag.‖ (For me, what I really want is
rehabilitation in our place for us living in the lower portion not to be affected in case there is
landslide and those living in the upper portion not to fall due to landslide.)9 Respondents stressed
what they understood as the additional infrastructure needed to make their place of residence safer.
This commonly involved the reinforcement of seawalls and the construction or rehabilitation of
dikes. In particularly vulnerable coastal areas (such as Santa Ilocos Sur) respondents put forward the
possibility of moving the entire community to safer, higher ground.
Figure 2: Community priorities for recovery and reconstruction (number of rural and urban sites)

In the neighboring towns of Bustos and Baliuag in Bulacan, communities stressed the need to finish the existing dike to protect low
lying areas from flooding, particularly when water is let out of nearby dams. Respondents from Botolan, Zambales, stressed that the
existing dike needs to be rehabilitated and reinforced.
8

9

FGD participant in Tublay, Benguet
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Table 8: Community understanding of recovery and reconstruction
Recovery











―Umaangat‖ or improving – community leaders perceive
recovery as involving some form of long term
assistance, including the provision of reconstruction
materials to rebuild homes, livelihood programs,
employment scholarships and housing. (Doña Imelda,
Quezon City)
―Loans‖ when someone is sick (Camacho II, Marikina
City)
Relief goods (Wawa, Taguig City)
Food, clothing, kitchen and house ware, medicine,
temporary wooden footbridges, cleaning and clearing
activities, tree planting, food donation, relief goods,
basic needs (San Fabian, Pangasinan)
Livelihood, borrowing money, agricultural crops as
recovery strategies, puhunan para sa negosyo, pinansyal (San
Ildefonso, Bulacan)
Short-term and uses fewer resources (Baliuag, Bulacan)
Livelihood, financial assistance (Tublay, Benguet)
Livelihood (Puguis, Benguet)

Reconstruction







Pumping of floodwater, construction of
elevated concrete path walks, jobs (Wawa,
Taguig City)
Repair of infrastructure such, roads, earth
dikes, housing repairs and donation of
construction materials and tools (San Fabian,
Pangasinan)
Capital intensive activities and infrastructure
repair (Baliuag, Bulacan)
Living in less affected areas or resettlement
(Tublay, Benguet)
Settlement of all financial obligations from
loans, housing repairs and livelihood
activities,
overcoming
the
traumatic
experience (Rosales, Pangasinan)
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3. Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Impact
3.1 Long-term impact on household income

While communities targeted by the study reported an overall reduction in income since
2009, households did not attribute their financial difficulties solely to Ondoy and Pepeng. They also
linked their present difficulties to the current economic situation (i.e. increased prices of goods, fuel).
―Hindi na dahil sa Ondoy…Kung sa Ondoy, naka-recover na talaga. Kaya lang iba na kasi talaga ngayon, mahirap
na talaga. Pero hindi na yun dahilan sa Ondoy.‖ [It is not because of Ondoy. People have already recovered from
Ondoy. It is different this time; life got harder.]. Doña Imelda, Quezon City
―Oo kaya lang, malaking pagbabago kasi po noon, hindi matumal, hindi ano…minsan pagbebentahan mo,
matumal na. mahirap nang kumita.” [Yes. There was a big change because before things were not
slow…most times what you sell is slow, it is hard to turn a profit.] (Botolan, Zambales)
In particular, communities reported that specific lines of activity and sources of income had
been in decline prior to 2009. This was clearly observed in two of the sites visited during the SIA, with a
continuing downward trend confirmed by the SIM in: (i) Malaban, Laguna, and (ii) Santa, Ilocos Sur. In
Malaban, participants in the study said that the shoe industry in the area had been experiencing difficulties
over a number of years. Local producers reported a limited ability, even before Ondoy and Pepeng, to
compete with larger manufacturers. The disaster and the resulting loss of assets and capital, therefore,
aggravated an already difficult situation. Similarly, in Santa, Ilocos Sur, income from fishing had been
progressively diminishing prior to 2009. The community reported that ipon, (goby fry) catches had been
predictable in previous years, peaking from October to February. These typically ensured a steady income
that helped meet family consumption needs.10 At the time of the assessment, however, ipon catches had
become unpredictable and the amount of other fish caught insufficient to meet daily consumption needs.
Focus Group Discussions and interviews, therefore, focused on identifying those impacts on
income and livelihoods considered by the communities to have been brought about by the 2009
disasters.
Sources of income and the types of jobs available have remained the same pre and post Ondoy/Pepeng in all sites
visited.
Following the initial reconstruction work of damaged homes and small businesses, no new
types of occupations were observed in the research sites. The main sources of income remained: (i) onfarm work in rural areas, and (ii) small scale enterprises and informal sector jobs in urban areas, as outlined in
Figure 3 below.

10

Ipon or goby fry is a small translucent (newly hatched) fish, which can fetch from Php 100.00 to Php 200.00 or more per kilo.
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As was noted during the SIA, the types of jobs and small scale business opportunities
continued to be more diversified in urban areas. In addition, wage work was also more frequently cited as
a source of income in these sites. This is particularly relevant as salaried workers were considered the most
likely to have recovered from the impact of the 2009 disasters, according to the participants in the study. Jobs
in sales, services and factories were highly desired. They were, however, mentioned as available only to the
more qualified young people in the community in Wawa (Taguig), Southville 4 (Laguna), GK Camacho
(Marikina) and West Bank Floodway (Pasig). Informants noted these selection criteria were strictly enforced
by recruitment companies, leaving older, less qualified residents to continue engaging in small-scale
enterprises and in contractual and informal services sector. These included construction work, driving,
providing domestic and laundry services – as was the case prior to the disaster. Residents continued to resort
to this type of temporary work to supplement their family income: ―Ganun pa rin [ang mga trabaho sa barangay].
Kasi yun ang alam nilang trabaho.” [The types of jobs in the barangay are still the same. It‘s because these are the
jobs that they are familiar with.] (taxi driver from Doña Imelda, Quezon City).
Figure 3: Types of occupations most frequently mentioned (number of sites)

Significant long term impacts on farmers and the self-employed (unskilled workers and small-scale business owners)
Reductions in income were attributed to the loss of assets and capital caused by the
typhoons and from which some categories of respondents (farmers, fishermen, small business
owners and informal sector workers) did not fully recover. Obtaining data on income using qualitative
methods is challenging. The research team was able to collect information on the average earnings of the
main occupational groups in urban areas.
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Table 9: Average earnings in main types of occupations
Occupations

GK Camacho Phase II

KV 1 Rizal

Self-employed
Skilled workers
Construction (carpenters, electricians, mason
and painters)

Php 200 to Php 500/day

Jeepney drivers

Php 60 to Php 100/day

Taxi drivers

Php 100 to Php 300/day

Php 250 to Php 400/day

Unskilled workers
Pedi-cab driver

Php 60 to Php 100/day

Php 50 to Php 100/day

Tricycle driver

Php 100 to Php 150/day

Php 60 to Php 200/day

Unskilled construction worker

Php 150/day

Domestic worker

Php 300/day (irregular)

Home-based businesses
Beautician
Laundry services

Php 200 to Php 500 (irregular
earnings
Php 300 to Php 350 (one or
twice/week)

Piece work (bags)

Php 10 to Php 15 per piece
(Php 150 to Php 300.day)

Sari-sari stores

Php 500/day (gross value of
sales)

Ambulant sellers

Php 150/day

Salaried workers
Qualified workers (LGU, stores and services)

Php 4,500 to Php
12,800/month

Unskilled workers (LGU street sweepers)

Php 500 to Php 1,000/week

Php 4,000/month

In all urban visited, the loss of capital and stock caused by Ondoy had a long term impact on
small businesses and reduced their profitability. In a number of instances, small businesses closed and
could not resume their activities due to heavy losses or to the need to divert capital to meet basic
expenditures or conduct urgent housing repairs. “Malaki po talaga, hindi tulad noon na wala pang Ondoy na maluwag
pa ang paghanap buhay namin. Hindi pa kami naubusan ng puhunan tsaka lalo na tumaas yung mga presyo ng bilihin.
Ngayon kung gusto naming gumawa ng paraan minsan nalulugi pa kami dahil maliit lang ang puhunan. Magpuhunan ka na
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ng limang daan hanggat maubos na ubos hindi nakaikot.” [The effect has been big. Before Ondoy, it was easier to
make a living. We never ran out of capital. The prices of goods have gone up and this has made it more
difficult because the capital is small. If you raise Php 500.00 for capital, it is next to impossible to turn a
profit.] (Baliuag, Bulacan). Participants in the study noted that they now sold fewer and cheaper products,
partly due to their inability to replenish stock lost during the floods and purchase new equipment. ―Naglalako
po siya [asawa] ngayon hanggang isang libo na lang, pagkasyahin yung pinamimili niya ng DVD… mga charger [para sa
cellphone], hindi na naibalik.” [My husband works around a capital of Php 1,000.00 for the DVD that he sells.
He does not sell cell phone chargers anymore.] (A vendor‘s wife, Doña Imelda, Quezon City). In addition,
street vendors resorted to selling in less secure locations (using karitons or pushcarts) to avoid the costs of
obtaining a fixed site for trading their wares. This was the case in Doña Imelda (Quezon City), for example.
In addition, even when local businesses were not directly affected or damaged, the fact that
customers no longer had sufficient income to spend, severely reduced earnings and led to further
closures. This was a pattern observed across all sites and can be illustrated with reference to the West Bank
Floodway site in Maybunga, Pasig City. There, the location of small businesses enabled them to escape most
of the damage. However, extensive destruction of homes in the area meant that a large number of households
either moved to other sites or drastically reduced consumption. Demand for services such as tricycles, for
example, dropped with more people willing to walk long distances in order to save. Similar reductions in
profit were reported for sari-sari stores and other small business across urban sites: ―Bago mag-Ondoy, tatlong
radio nare-repair ko sa isang araw pero di naman nila tinutubos, minsan inaabot pa ng isang linggo kaya wala din ako gasino
nakukuha.” [Before Ondoy, I get to fix three radios in one day, but now they don‘t get them back.
Sometimes, they don‘t get them for up to a week (Malaban, Laguna)]. “Kapag may order, gagawa kami, pero minsan
kahit yung order di naman kami binabayaran.” [If there is an order, we make it but sometimes the customer does
not pay (Malaban, Laguna)].
In rural areas, the destruction of the means of livelihood fields, gardens, fishponds, crops,
animals (e.g. carabaos, fowls, pigs), and equipment (e.g. boats, fishing and farming equiment) had
significant long term impacts on rural and peri-urban communities. (Botolan, Zambales; Naguilian, La
Union; San Fabian, Pangasinan). In highly affected areas such as Botolan, Zambales, the size of arable land
decreased following the typhoons 11 as did overall land productivity (the yield is currently only about 80% of
what could be harvested previous to the 2009 typhoon season). Across12 nearly half of the rural sites, the
damage caused to low-lying areas meant that a number of households permanently lost all or part of their
land. In addition, in these severely affected communities, respondents noted that: (i) hiring of agricultural
laborers was reduced as land owners attempted to recover from the losses brought about by the disasters, and
(ii) farming can become a secondary source of income if soil erosion has been extreme. This resulted in
exceptional cases of migration to urban areas: ― We go to the city so we can get hired and earn‖. (Sabang Buho
Nueva Ecija)

The October 2009 records of the Municipal Agriculture Office (MAO) in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, on damage caused by Ondoy and
Pepeng, as well as by the flooding caused by the release of water from Pantabangan Dam, showed that a total of 273.89 hectares of
rice farms in the municipality were affected with no chance of recovery.
11

12

Botolan, (Zambales); San Fabian (Pangasinan), Tublay (Benguet), San Idelfonso (Bulacan) and Sapang Buho (Nueva Ecija)
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Similar to the trend observed in urban areas, the lack of capital to recover from these losses
has required significant adaptations in the way affected households earn their living. Those engaged
in capital-intensive livelihoods resorted to modified forms of their previous line of work that again
required less inputs and investment. This was noted across all rural areas and can be exemplified with
reference to Tublay (Benguet), where those who lost their land now work in neighboring farms, earning
approximately Php 200.00 a day. “Syak met mam kasla observation ko mam, idi di awan pay ti ondoy mostly dagijay
karkarruba mi saysayote da kasla da kmi ngem idi syempre di nalpas dyay awan ti pagsayotean kapilitan ag per day a kami,”
one woman-resident disclosed.” [Ma‘am, my observation is before Ondoy most of the people in the neighborhood
had farms and they planted sayote, but after the typhoon, they lost their farms and were forced to work in
other people‘s farms.].
Fishing was no longer a primary source of livelihood in any of the costal or riverine sites
visited (as noted in the SIA) due to a steady decrease in catch. Fish farming did, however, play an
important role as a complementary source of income. As with farmers, the loss of the investment made in
fish farming equipment had long term negative effects. Where fish-pens were destroyed by Ondoy, fish
farmers were unable to secure the capital needed to return to their initial line of activity.
Across all rural sites, respondents highlighted that available capital had been diverted away
from their income generation activities to meet basic consumption needs. There was a widespread shift
to less secure occupations. Participants reported working as daily laborers at markets, construction workers,
tricycle drivers, domestic workers or labanderas (doing laundry), with the amount earned remaining insufficient
to meet daily needs:
―May palaisdaan po ako (noong bago ang Ondoy). Inutang ko po ang ginamit ko doon. Sa pagdaan ng Ondoy ay nawash out po lahat. Para ho akong nagbalik sa zero…” […I had a fish pen before Ondoy. The capital I used in
putting it up just came from a loan. Then Ondoy came and washed everything away. Now, it feels like I‘m
back to zero.]
“Ngayon ay kailangan pa nilang mag-tindera na lang, nagtitinda na lang sa bayan ng hindi sariling yari o kaya
mamamasukan sa konstruksiyon….dati may sarili silang puhunan, sariling gamit, may tindang sariling materyales….ang
puhunan nawala!” [Now they have to work as mere sellers, they sell in town stuff that they didn‘t make, or they
work in construction sites. In the past, we had our own capital, our own materials; now even capital we don‘t
have!]

Within communities: different recovery trajectories.
Wage workers in urban areas and in exceptional cases, households with family members
working abroad, had a sufficiently steady stream of resources to offset the impact of the 2009 disasters.
Regular income enabled these households to continue borrowing and making regular debt payments. These
cases, however, constitute a minority of respondents. The research team found only two instances of
communities households with connections to overseas workers (Wawa, Taguig, and Gawad Kalinga Camacho
Phase II) and a reduced number of sites where wage work in services and sales was reported as a source of
income. The latter were all urban areas: Malaban, Biñan City, Laguna; Southville 4, Santa Rosa City, Laguna;
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Gawad Kalinga Camacho Phase II, Nangka, Marikina City; Westbank Mangahan Floodway, Maybunga, Pasig
City; Kasiglahan Village 1, San Jose, Montalban, Rizal, and Wawa, Taguig City
In two of the rural communities visited, increased prices of agricultural commodities had
played an important part in the recovery of some of the affected households. In Sapang Buho, Nueva
Ecija, respondents indicated that their recovery process started in 2011 as ―it was only this time that the price of
onion went high‖. Some households in Tublay (Benguet) were also able to take advantage of higher prices of
cut flowers to generate additional income. As with wage work in urban areas, this constitutes the exception to
the overall trend of decreased earnings observed across sites.
Communities were consistent in their views of who the most vulnerable among them were.
These were the households that had suffered the most serious losses. In rural areas, these were without
exception residents who owned land in low-lying areas. In urban areas, they were primarily small business
owners in ―danger areas‖ of the community. The fact that households‘ means of livelihood have become
increasingly insecure also means that residents consider those with elderly or sick relatives as particularly
vulnerable. With household income being fully absorbed by spending on basic needs, unforeseen medical
expenses can have a critical impact on the family‘s budget. In addition, across rural and urban areas, the
overall perception was that the widespread move to less profitable occupations made women more
vulnerable. Skills mostly held by men (in construction, for example) tended to be higher demand for the
repair of damaged houses. Demand for the type unskilled work mostly carried out by women, including
domestic work or laundry services, tended to drop, as this was one of the areas in which households could
save. ―Mga karpintero, hindi nawala. Pero yun mga kababaihan nawalan ng trabaho po.” [The carpenters did not lose
their jobs. But the women lost their jobs.] (Botolan, Zambales).
3.2 Limited assistance for livelihood restoration

Livelihood assistance was provided to the vast majority of the communities covered in the
study. Within the 20-month period that followed Ondoy and Pepeng, 18 of the 21 areas visited had
received some form of financial assistance. The exceptions were Poblacion (Baliuag), Malaban (Biñan),
and Southville 5A, where households (96.8% of those surveyed) indicated receiving no livelihood support
directly related to post Ondoy/Pepeng recovery. The primary sources of support mentioned by respondents
were as follows:


Existing social protection and livelihoods programs implemented by DSWD. While these are
not emergency or disaster response programs they were seen by participants in the study as providing
key resources during their recovery. The existing Conditional Cash Transfer program, Pantawid
Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4 Ps)13 was mentioned by respondents in two of the sites visited. The

―The Pantawid Pamilya is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program which provides cash to beneficiary households, subject to
compliance with program conditionalities. The Pantawid Pamilya is targeted at chronicly poor households with children aged 0-14
years who are located in poor areas. The cash grants range from P500 (US$11) to P1,400 (US$32) per household per month,
depending on the number of eligible children. To qualify for the grants, beneficiary households must undertake certain activities that
are meant to improve the children‘s health and education such as visiting health centers regularly, sending the children to school, and
undertaking preventive check-ups for pregnant women.‖ By January 2011 the program had approximately one million beneficiaries,
World Bank (2011), Social Protection Note Overview of the Philippines‘ Conditional Cash Transfer Program: The Pantawid Pamilyang
Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya)
13
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Self- Employment Assistance program (SEA-K)14 was present in 12 communities, primarily rural
and, in all cases, pre-dating the disaster.


Cash or Food for Work was implemented by local governments in partnership with international
development partners (World Food Program), civil society organizations and, in some instances, the
private sector. Communities in ten of the 19 sites covered reported receiving this type of assistance.
The amounts or in kind support provided to beneficiaries, the type and duration of work and the
targeting system used varied significantly across sites.



Emergency grants or loans were also made available to the most affected households by local
government and civil society organizations. This type of support was noted in 12 of the sites
covered, with the amounts provided varying from Php 8,000.00 to Php 2,000 (approximately US$186
to US$45). The conditions, intended uses of the loans or grants, and the criteria used for targeting
varied greatly as did the repayment conditions (where applicable). In a significant number of cases
the capital made available through these schemes was diverted away from livelihood activities, and
was used instead for housing reconstruction. As highlighted in Table 11 below instances were also
noted where funds normally used for running small businesses were needed to meet basic
consumption expenses.

The SEAK Program is a community-based, credit assistance program utilizing people‘s organizations called SEA Kaunlaran
Associations (SKAs). The program supports poor households to develop and implement micro-enterprise projects providing capital
and technical assistance. In 2009, there were 1,389 SEA-K projects established benefiting 28,939 families nationwide. Funds
amounting to Php143,089,000 million had been released as seed capital for the livelihood projects. (http://www.dswd.gov.ph)
14
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Table 10: Assistance received for livelihood recovery

Target Area
1.

Short-term

Urban
Longer Term

Barangay Malaban,
Biñan City, Laguna

Gaps and community
observations
Participants outlined the lack
of support for livelihood
rehabilitation
Reports of capital used for
small businesses used for basic
consumption

2.

Southville 4, Barangay
Caingin and Barangay
Pooc, Santa Rosa City,
Laguna

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments (Php 5,000)

3.

Gawad
Kalinga
Camacho Phase II,
Nangka, Marikina City

Cash for Work implemented
by CSOs and the city LGU
(approximately 300 beneficiary
households with Php 100/day
or Php 500-1,000/week
depending on the work carried
out)

4.

Barangay
Cabanatuan
Nueva Ecija

5.

Barangay
Sapang
Buho, Palayan City,
Nueva Ecija

6.

Caudillo,
City,

Westbank Mangahan
Floodway, Maybunga,
Pasig City

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments *
Food for Work/Training
(limited number of
beneficiaries)

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments *
Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments (Php 5,000) *
Conditional Cash Transfers
(Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program) with 200 beneficiaries
Cash for Work (28
beneficiaries)
Food for Work (100
beneficiaries provided with 25
kg of rice for four hour daily
work during a three day
period)

Livelihood training provided
by TESDA for relocated
households

Participants outlined the lack
of capital and continued
technical assistance for
livelihood rehabilitation. These
gaps limited the usefulness of
the vocational training
provided

Self-Employment Assistance
(Php 3,000 to 5,000)

Participants stressed that the
assistance received had been
very limited. They highlighted
the importance of capital for
livelihood restoration as well
as on-going technical
assistance
Participants stressed that the
assistance received had been
limited and highlighted the
lack of capital for livelihood
restoration
Unsustainability of livelihood
interventions as capital is
diverted to meet basic
livelihood needs

Self-Employment Assistance
(Php 3,000 to 5,000)
Seed and fertilizer subsidies
(DA and Local Governments)
Vegetable selling business
initiated by a barangay
counselor (15 beneficiaries)
Livelihood loans provided by
the San Miguel Corporation
(Php 5,000 to 10,000) for 200
beneficiaries
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7.

8.

9.

Barangay
Doña
Imelda, Quezon City

Kasiglahan Village 1,
San Jose, Montalban,
Rizal

Barangay
Taguig City

Wawa,

Cash/Food for Work

Participants outlined the lack
of longer term support for
livelihood rehabilitation

Conditional Cash Transfers
(Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program)
Cash/Food for Work (300 to
400 beneficiaries receiving
between Php 1,000 to Php
1,200 as well as rice for two
weeks‘ work)
Livelihood loans and
livelihood training (provided
by CSOs) to an estimated 30
beneficiaries.
Emergency loans for small
businesses provided by DOLE
(Php 5,000)
Cash for Work (120
beneficiaries receiving
approximately Php 110 for
four hours of work/daily)

Self-Employment Assistance
(Php 5,000 provided to 25
beneficiaries)
Loans for livelihood activities
provided by the municipal
government in partnership
with CSO, private sector
organization (Php 5,000 seed
capital for 30 beneficiarie; hp
3,000 with a cell-phone
provided to 37 beneficiaries.
Jobs fairs conducted by PESO
(job placements for young
people in call centers and
factories)
Skills training in handy crafts
(dried flowers) sponsored.

10. Eusebio BLISS,
Maybunga, Pasig City
11. Southville
5A,
Langkiwa,
Biñan,
Laguna

Self-Employment Assistance
(Php 3,000 to 5,000)
Participants indicated the lack
of financial assistance received
for livelihood recovery.

Rural
Longer Term

Target Area

Short-term

1.

Cash/Food for Work

Self-Employment Assistance

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments (Php 5,000)*

Small scale skills training
initiative by a private donor
(Php 35,000) with additional
resources allocated to a
livelihood fund Php 500,000
by the area‘s Congressman

Barangay Puguis, La
Trinidad, Benguet

Gaps and community
observations
The participants highlighted:
(i) the lack of longer-term
assistance provided; (ii) the
lack of capital for livelihood
restoration and (iii) the need
for credit at lower interest
rates
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2.

Barangay Ambassador,
Tublay, Benguet

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments (Php 8,000 to
Php 3,000 depending on the
damage to property provided
to 24 households) *

Self-Employment Assistance
Livelihoods training and inkind support provided by CSO
(animal husbandry) with
approximately 104 beneficiary
households

Food for Work
3.

Barangay
Poblacion,
Baliuag, Bulacan

4.

Barangay
Poblacion,
Bustos, Bulacan

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments *

Self-Employment Assistance
(Php 5,000 provided to 25
beneficiaries)

Food for Work covering
approximately 180 households

Livelihood training (candle
making, cell phone repair, food
processing for a limited
number of beneficiaries)

5.

Barangay
Pulong
Tamo, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan

Support provided by the
Department of Agriculture in
the form of seed
subsidies(approximately 180
farmers) and fertilizer
subsidies (20 farmers)

Self-Employment Assistance
pre-dating Ondoy/Pepeng
with 30 beneficiaries (Php
3,000 seed money provided to
small businesses)

6.

Barangay
Natividad,
Naguilian, La Union

Cash/Food for Work

Self-Employment Assistance

Emergency Grants provided
by municipal governments
(Php 2,000 to households
identified as poor)*

Livelihood training provided
by the Philippines Red Cross
(food processing)

Unsustainability of the
livelihood recovery activities
initiated by CSO with no
market for new products.
Lack of capital highlighted as
an important limiting factor in
livelihood recovery.
While participants highlighted
the relief assistance received
no livelihood rehabilitation
programs were mentioned
during FDGs and KIIs
Community highlighted the
lack of support to small
businesses

The lack of capital was
highlighted as factor limiting
livelihood recovery. Other
important gaps in the
assistance provided were: (i)
assistance in marketing their
produce, (ii) assistance to
diversify livelihoods (livestock
rearing for example) and (iii)
training on new technologies.
Unsustainability of small-scale
business ventures primarily
because capital was diverted to
meet daily consumption needs

Emergency Grants provided
by the Philippines‘ Red Cross
(Php 7,000) for livelihood
activities to five families
7.

Barangay Tabucolan,
Santa, Ilocos Sur

Emergency Grants/Loans
provided by municipal
governments *

Self-Employment Assistance
Skills training conducted by
the municipality (limited
number of beneficiaries)

Participants highlighted: (i)
difficulties in accessing training
for specific skills that would
help them find overseas
employment (distance to
training venue and cost); (ii)
lack of capital for livelihood
restoration
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8.

Barangay East Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan

Emergency Grants provided
by the Philippines‘ Red Cross
(Php 7,000) for livelihood
activities

Self-Employment Assistance

Availability of Php 5,000 loans
for livelihood activities from
the municipality

9.

Barangay
Longos
Central, San Fabian,
Pangasinan

10. Barangay Carael,
Botolan, Zambales

Participants highlighted that
they did not agreed with the
proposed re-payment
conditions of the municipal
livelihood loans.
Grants provided by the Red
Cross were often diverted
from livelihood recovery to
housing reconstruction.

Self-Employment Assistance
Php 500 seed capital provided
to 310 beneficiaries to start a
vegetable selling business
Self-Employment Assistance
Livelihood training provided
(beauticians, food processing)
to a small number of
beneficiaries

There were reports of some
households relocation due to
the lack of livelihood
opportunities.
Participants highlighted the
limited assistance received for
livelihood recovery with some
reporting receiving no
assistance
Participants highlighted
challenges in using the training
received to establish small
businesses: (i) insufficient time
due to child care
responsibilities; (ii) lack of
capital was considered the
main obstacle to livelihood
restoration

Page 31 of 80

Lack of capital remains the single biggest obstacle to recovery
With the exception of Wawa (Taguig) and Baliuag (Bulacan) all of the remaining communities
considered that the support provided did not respond to their long-term livelihood recovery needs.
While some form of livelihood assistance was observed by the research team in the majority of sites, the
overall perception was that the amount of resources made available during the recovery phase was
insufficient.
“Basta wala talaga yang pangmatagalan [na assistance]. Pero yung tulong na ano [relief], meron naman.” [There was no
long-term assistance. But there was relief.] (Community leader, Doña Imelda, Quezon City)
“Wala naman tumulong sa amin. Puro lang relief goods. Pero yung sabi na pang puhunan, wala.” [No one assisted us.
There were only relief goods. But when it comes to financial assistance for livelihood, there was
none.] (Street sweeper, Doña Imelda, Quezon City).
“Dakkel ti pasalamat mi ti tulong nga inted da. Adu piman ti tinmulong idi nga nagited ti makan kas kuma ti
bagas, pansit ken badbadu. Ngem apigbiit ngay dagitoy haan na nga nasabet tit alga nga kasapulan mi… jay kuma
pagbalayan ken pangtulong ti pagbiagan nu ada panakabalin na… ni dandani manen panagtotodo…” [We are much
thankful for the help they gave us. A lot gave us food like rice, noodles, and clothing. However, these
were for our short-term needs, and they did not answer our real needs. We want house and livelihood
assistance if it is possible…the rainy season is near again…] (La Trinidad, Benguet)
Adu piman ti naitulong da kadakami idi ada kami jay Puguis Elementary School nga nagbalin nga evacuation
center idi. Adu ti makan kas kuma bagas, noodles ken badbadu mi ngem idi mapalabas ti manu nga domingo ket awan
met naitulong nga pagbiagan, nga pagrugian kuma manen… kasla ngay nga apagbiit lang dagijay nga tulong…ngem
agpasalamat kami met ketdi…” [They helped us a lot when we were in the evacuation site, Puguis
Elementary School. They gave us rice, noodles, and clothing, but after few weeks they did not help us in
any form of livelihood, through which we could start again…as if the help given to us was on a shortterm basis. We are thankful though.] (La Trinidad, Benguet)
The most frequently mentioned factor behind the inability to resume a profitable livelihood
activity was the lack of capital: “ Anyone can attend the training but it‟s all lecture. All they do is teach.” (Botolan,
Zambales) This view was echoed in 17 of the 19 sites where the qualitative research module was implemented
(including all rural areas). In a number of instances communities reported that the amount of the loans or
grants being made available in their communities‘ was not sufficient to purchase stock or repair equipment to
resume their livelihood activities.
Kurang met Php 5000.00...kurang... [Php 5,000.00 is not enough.] (Local leader, Rosales, Pangasinan)
Kailangan Php 10,000.00. [It must be Php 10,000.00.] (Local leader, Rosales, Pangasinan)
Before Ondoy, it was easier to make a living. We never ran out of capital. The prices of goods have gone up and it
has made it more difficult because the capital is small. If you raise Php 500.00 for capital, it is next to
impossible to turn a profit. Poblacion (Baliuag, Bulacan)
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The research team systematically observed that funds set aside for livelihood activities were
diverted to cover basic household needs. This included basic consumption, medical care, or urgent
housing repairs. In three of sites visited the need to divert funds away from livelihood activities was
highlighted as the main reason for the lack of sustainability of the small-business interventions supported in
the aftermath of Ondoy and Pepeng.
―The five families that lost their houses to Pepeng received Php 7,000.00 each as starting capital for their livelihood. One
recipient put up a sari-sari store, another began a business of selling rice and frozen goods, and one became a balot and chicharon
vendor. The fourth recipient used the money to revive her dressmaking livelihood by putting it as capital for tela (cloth). The fifth
recipient bought a sow that has now given birth to piglets. Among these, the only ones that are left alive are the balot-chicharon
business, the dressmaking shop, and the “sow-raising” livelihood…the one who engaged in selling rice has used up the finances of
the business for the family‟s daily needs. On the other hand, the sari-sari store closed down because the capital had to be used for
medical expenses.” Natividad (Naguilian, La Union)
Improvements in the design of skills training and livelihood programs
Participants in the study also highlighted the importance of ensuring that the livelihood training
provided was relevant to their context and local markets. In seven of the 19 areas visited, participants
stressed that the way in which the training had been provided limited their ability to use the skills learned in a
profitable occupation. The main shortcomings of the skills and livelihood support provided were as follows:


Skills selected for training were not always relevant for the local market. Communities
systematically highlighted the limited linkages between training and access to employment.
Respondents stressed the need to reinforce partnerships with potential employers.
―Tuturo ng mga dapat na pakinabangan. Actually nga, wala na eh. Hindi naman sila gumagawa ng pabrika ang
Gobyerno para yung napag-aralan namin maibuhos namin doon, para walang squatter. Walang tambay, di ba? Kung
yung tinuturo sa atin, paggawa ng sabon, paggawa ng kendi, tocino, longganisa… at naipasok tayo sa mga pabrikang
dapat na tutulong sa atin, yun ang tulong na pangmatagalan.” [Teach us something that can benefit us. We
have none of that. The Government does not even put up factories where we can apply the things
that we learn from livelihood trainings. And then there will be no more squatters or bums. If they
teach us how to manufacture soap, candy, tocino, longganisa, and at the same time hire us in
factories were we can get regular employment, that becomes long-term assistance.], Doña Imelda,
Quezon City.



The lack of continued support, including to market and sell products, limited the
profitability of the small businesses. The respondents suggested that livelihood and skills training
include the development of marketing strategies.



Particularly in rural areas and peri-urban areas, respondents highlighted the importance of
diversifying livelihood opportunities and of receiving training on the use of new technologies.
Where the income from farming had been decreasing having access to alternative sources of income
was seen as crucial: ―We need alternative livelihoods, especially for the women, so that they do not
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have to depend on their husband farmers. They do not have to depend on the farms alone.
Calamities are always a problem for farmers.‖ (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). Respondents also stressed the
importance of new knowledge about high yielding and more profitable crops, or the use of new
pesticides and equipment: “Karagdagang kaalaman tungkol po sa mga tanim. Hindi naman po kasi yung peste
noon araw ay yun pa rin yung peste ngayon. May mga bagong lumalabas na bago.‖ [Additional knowledge about
farming. The pests now are not the same as the pests before. There are new types coming out.],
Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija).

3.3. Coping strategies

The most common coping strategies observed by the research team were consistent with the
trends seen during the SIA. As outlined in Figure 4, they remained: (i) taking on additional or temporary
jobs where available, (ii) reducing consumption, and (iii) getting multiple loans, including for basic
expenditures.
Figure 4: Most frequently observed coping strategies (number of sites)

In spite of multiple jobs, income remains insufficient to cover basic consumption needs
The low skill set of respondents and the lack of capital, aggravated by the 2009 disasters, seem to
have contributed to a concentration of respondents in a reduced number of occupations. These tend
to be gender-segregated, with men occupying better paid construction jobs, as well as more insecure jobs in
the transport sector (ranging from driving taxis, to jeepneys and finally to taxis and pedicabs). Men remain the
primary income earners in all sites. Women are primarily found in domestic and laundry services. They are
also responsible for managing sari-sari stores and a number of home-based businesses (including piece work),
which give them greater flexibility to simultaneously handle domestic tasks. Sari-sari stores are extremely
widespread, with respondents indicating that at least four or five exist in the immediate vicinity of their
homes. Other types of small businesses are significantly rarer, particularly in rural areas, as illustrated in Figure
5 below. This lack of diversity in the types of informal work available seems, in some instances, to have
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contributed to decreased earnings. This is the case for pedicab drivers, for example, where intense
competition for passengers has reduced profits.
Figure 5: “Beyond sari-sari stores” – types of local businesses in research sites

Income is, therefore, very uncertain (Table 9 above) and the lack of a steady income requires
that households be highly opportunistic in pursuing livelihood opportunities. The need to meet
specific monthly expenditures, like utility bills or transport costs, systematically require that all household
members contribute to the family budget:
―Yung mga lalaki nagcoconstruction pumapasok sa mga water…naghuhukay gumawa ng tubo…tapos yung ibang
nagtatanim na pwepwede sa taniman [The men do construction work or dig for pipe-laying and then there are
others who plant in areas which can be planted on].‖ When money is particularly tight, the entire family
pitches in to meet a financial goal. “Kami naman kapag bill na ng kuryente biglaan na putulan ka sama-sama kami
maglaba ng plastic [When the electric bill arrives and we are about to get cut off, we all pitch in and wash
plastic].‖ This type of work—cleaning dirty plastic—yields PhP 30.00 per ten kilos of cleaned plastic.
Poblacion, Baliuag, (Bulacan)
With the exception of wage workers or
skilled workers in the construction sector,
therefore, taking on additional work has not
enabled
households
to
meet
basic
consumption needs. The main categories of
expenditure were consistent across all sites: (i)
food, making up to 80 percent of the household
budget, (ii) utility bills (water and electricity), (iii)
transport to work and to school, and (iv) rent.
Interestingly, medical expenses were not factored
into the household budget. Regular income is not
sufficient to deal with medical costs in case of
illness of a household member: ―Those who get sick
are not given full support in terms of medicine.‖ (Palayan
City, Nueva Ecija). Participants in the study
frequently referred to medical expenses as
―occasional expenses‖ in the same category as ―vices
and extras‖.

Earning an income by driving a pedicab in KV1
There are more than 600 units operating in the
area (excluding unlicensed operators). A pedicab
driver has to spend Php 10,000 to purchase a cab
and Php 3,000 to Php 3,500 for licenses and other
administration expenses. This puts owning their
own vehicles out of reach for a significant number
of residents. Average earnings are usually between
Php 60 to Php 100 per day. Rent to the pedicab‘s
owner is due daily on weekdays (Php 40). ―Nay
Ime‖, a woman pedicab driver from KV1, reports
that the income that remains to meet her family‘s
needs is currently around Php 50/day. Nay Ime
used to earn more previously. A greater number of
cabs in the area, however, led to ―cut throat‖
competition for passengers.
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Transportation costs are essential to get to work and to school. While there are isolated reports
of community members willing to walk longer distances to save on transport costs, it is usually by
cutting down on food that respondents reduce household expenses. Reducing the number of meals and
the quality of the food consumed was observed in all urban sites, without exception. Interestingly, only half
of rural communities explicitly referred to reduced food in-take as a coping strategy. Close ties with
neighbors, a culture of tulungan (solidarity) and the ability to grow some produce for home-consumption were
the main reasons put forward by respondents to explain these patterns: ―For example, we will borrow rice from our
neighbor, our neighbor will give us some. Next time if they borrow some rice from us, we will give them some as well. In spite of
the hard times, we can always find something to eat”[…] “ If you are not picky you will not run out of viands here‖ (San
Idelfonso, Bulacan).
As was noted in the SIA, children frequently go to school without an allowance to purchase food.
The household budget cannot cover both the cost of transport and food: “ She does it as a sacrifice. She
knows we do not have money. She goes to school with only transportation money in hand. She puts up with her hunger until she
arrives here.‖ (Southville 4, Santa Rosa Laguna) In a significant number of instances, households will cut other
categories of expenses before removing their children from school. There is an explicit recognition that
attending school is essential if children are to be able to earn a better living than their parents: ―Education is a
burden we must bear, we pay for it by forgoing what we can eat instead. Education‟s for free. For our school children‟s allowance,
Php 20 should be enough.‖ (Malaban, Laguna). I worked as a house help and my husband did construction work so that our
eldest child could finish elementary education. And then when we get home from work, we do farm labor so we can pay our
debts.‖ ( Palayan City, Nueva Ecija)

While removing children from school all together was a last resort, the number of sites where
households reported they could no longer afford schooling expenses increased from 2009 to 2011, as
did the instances of children working. The SIA indicated that in the majority of areas children had
returned to school after the initial disruption caused by the floods. Reports of children temporarily dropping
out of school or working (primarily by recovering scrap material) were found in six sites in 2009 and in nine
in 2011:
―Children stopped going to school due to the poverty of their parents. Sometimes they just roam around. They scavenge for
plastic that they can sell, so that they can help.‖ (Malaban, Laguna). ―My child who was in grade 2 had to stop because my
husband and I had no means of earning. We are hired farm laborers and we go out of the barangay so that we can work in the
fields. (Palayan City, Nueva Ecija)
―Tsaka yung paghahakot…kasi paglabas mo dyan e maghakot ka lang kikita ka na…kahit mga bata, karaniwan
nangangalakal…mga plastic yung mga pwedeng irecycle.” [Hauling…just around the area, you can just haul junk and
you can turn a profit. Even the children, most of them trade recyclable plastics.] Poblacion, Baliuag,
(Bulacan)
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Taking on multiple loans, including for basic household expenses, is essential to make ends meet
Financial support from relatives continued to be rare, in line with the SIA findings. Being able to
rely on financial help from family was reported in four of the 19 research sites. This type of support was
primarily extended in the form of loans. In only one of the research sites (Botolan, Zambales), did
respondents refer to ―cash gifts‖. These were sporadic and made available in emergency situations (with
amounts ranging from Php 1,300 to Php 3,000).
The practice of borrowing from multiple sources seems to have intensified in all research areas.
Respondents sought credit not only for livelihood activities or unexpected expenses (such as medical
emergencies) but also to cover basic needs: ―There are lots of items included in the budget: school, capital, food, electricity
and water. Half goes to livelihood capital and then for school. Our earnings are not enough. I am able to send my child to school
through debts. After harvest I pay them off slowly.” (Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija)
3.4 Access to credit and levels of debt
As outlined in the SIA, taking on multiple loans was a practice commonly observed in rural and
urban areas even before the disasters. A key finding of the analysis conducted in 2009 was that levels of
debt were increasing. Farmers, who regularly borrowed for agricultural inputs, were particularly affected as
the disasters hit immediately before the harvest. Small business owners in urban areas had similarly (although
less frequently) taken out loans to purchase equipment and inventory. Loans with informal lenders had,
therefore, been contracted in the aftermath of the typhoons to pay debts with land owners or suppliers. In
addition, there was an overall concern that the loss of assets caused by the disasters would significantly limit
access to credit from Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs). Across all areas visited, participants in the SIA
indicated that informal lenders were their primary source of loans in the post-disaster period.
Availability and sources of credit
In spite of the concerns expressed by respondents during the SIA, the research team found that,
overall, credit remained available. However, a decrease in the availability of formal lending sources was
reported in two sites of 19 areas covered by the study (Westbank Floodway, Pasig and Baliuag, Bulacan): “
They left after Ondoy because they were afraid of giving out loans. Before I was the one recruiting for ASA (a MFI in the
locality). People no longer paid us so they left… TSPI (another MFI) also did not continue its operations after Ondoy. 15‖
Respondents in both sites indicated a parallel rise in the use of informal lenders.
Sources of credit have broadly remained the same since 2009 (Figure 6). The role played by sari-sari
stores as well as friends and family as sources of credit seems to have been less significant during the recovery
phase. This is consistent with the idea that support from relatives is intended above all for acute emergencies.

15

Westbank Floodway, Pasig
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Figure 6: SIA and SIM - main sources of credit mentioned (number of sites)16

There were no significant patterns observed in the availability of credit and sources of loans
across formal and informal sites. Variations across rural and urban areas were slight (Figure 7). While
MFIs were marginally more prevalent in urban areas, informal lenders were more frequently mentioned as
sources of loans in rural areas. Sari-sari stores were primarily used for the purchase of food on credit in urban
areas. Higher levels of support from neighbors in rural areas, when it comes to the pooling of resources and
the sharing of food, may partly explain this pattern (Section 3.3 above).
Figure 7: SIM - Sources of credit most frequently mentioned in rural and urban areas (number of sites)

Information used for the SIA and SIM comparison excludes data for Wawa (Taguig), which was not covered in the initial
assessment and San Idelfonso (Bulacan), Ambassador, Tublay (Benguet) for which information on access to credit was not collected
during the SIA.
16
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Households in urban areas were, however, able to draw on a wider number of Micro-Finance
Institutions (MFIs). The most commonly found MFIs across rural and urban areas were: CARD, TSPI,
MKBI and ASA. In addition, a large number of smaller MFIs were present in urban areas (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Micro-finance institutions mentioned by respondents (number of sites)

Uses and conditions of loans
While banks and MFIs primarily lend for livelihood activities (up to Php 50,000), informal
lenders tend to provide smaller amounts (a maximum of Php 5,000) that can be used for basic
consumption or emergency needs. The research team observed a few exceptions to this general pattern.
Across rural sites visited, taking out personal loans from bigger land-owners, private financiers or suppliers of
agricultural inputs was frequent. For larger loans (Php 50,000), land was usually provided as collateral. A
similar type of loan was extended in urban areas to some small businesses where inputs and raw materials
were purchased on credit. In both cases, there were instances reported where the creditors themselves
purchased the farm harvests or the finished items thus significantly reducing the profit that could have been
generated from these goods.
The SIM observed no significant changes in lending terms since 2009. In 17 of the study sites,
interest rates have remained the same for both formal and informal lending sources.17 Access to
loans from banks and MFIs typically required a credit check and basic documentation as part of the
application procedure. Collateral and a prior ―business history‖ is usually required by banks. While smaller
business loans with MFIs do not always require collaterals, a screening process is used to assess whether the
household has sufficient regular income to repay the loan. Loans are primarily extended to women based on
the incomes earned by the male head of the household. A number of the MFIs active in the sites visited lend
to groups of women only. In this case, the group acts as the guarantor of individual debt. For both individual
and group loans fines are usually charged for late payment. While informants were very aware of the
advantages of borrowing from MFIs, their current financial situation means that they often did not meet the
17

The exceptions were Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (peri-urban) and Naguilian, La Union (rural).
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requirements needed to borrow: ― It‟s difficult […] you need to attend the meetings and if you don‟t have initial savings
you don‟t have anything. That‟s why others prefer 5/6. […]. There are better sources of financing, such as CARD, which has
benefits.” Although are obligated and they are strict. If something happens to you: if you meet with an accident, if you die, there is
money for you, as though you are insured, but they are also prone to scolding you.‖ (Baliuag, Bulacan). The majority of the
MFI lending schemes include a forced savings component, where weekly loan payments are supplemented by
small savings (usually around Php 40 or Php 50). These were frequently mentioned by respondents as one of
the key advantages of joining an MFI: ―What I do is that I join these lending organizations so that I have savings. For
example, I have Php 50, I will set it aside so I have something to give to the MFI and keep in my account‖18
Respondents systematically indicated, therefore, resorting to informal lenders because of the
easier access conditions and the ability to re-negotiate payment terms if needed. The ability to access
funds relatively quickly offset the difficulties caused by the higher interest rates charged. Some types of
informal loans, however, are used in emergency situations only. These are typically for small amounts of Php
500 to Php 1,000 where extremely high interest rates are charged (Table 11). While no collateral is usually
needed for this type of informal loans, lenders sometimes require their borrowers to purchase items from
their commercial establishments (blankets, kettles for example), often at higher than market prices.
Confiscating household appliances until payment is secured was an approach commonly used by informal
lenders. Collectors were also reported to do ―sit ins‖ at the defaulters homes until payment is made.

18

Westbank Floodway, Pasig
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Primary
Use
Farming

Source

Amount

Interest

Conditions

Personal loans
(kasama) with
large scale
land-owner,
supplier of
agricultural
products

Php
10,0000 to
Php 50,000

10%
(month)

Collateral required for Php 50,000
Social connection with the lender
The repayment of the loan amount is
deducted from the harvest proceeds.
The remaining profit is divided equally
between borrower and creditor
(individual terms can be negotiated)

Payment
frequency
After the
harvest

Sanctions

Negotiated
(after sale
date)

No further credit
extended in case of
default,

Monthly

Fines are applied
for late payment
and collateral lost in
case of default

Payments
are
collected
weekly

Fines are applied
for late payment;
delays reduce the
chances of being
granted a
subsequent loans,
some MFIs also
confiscate
households items
until payment is
made

Interest
can be
collected
daily or
weekly

Household items
can be confiscated
until payment is
made

No further credit
extended in case of
default, instances
where land has been
lost

Interest due monthly

Small
business

Supplier

Bank

Micro-Finance
Institution

Inputs/
materials
purchase
on credit

10%
(month)

Php 5,000
to Php
50,000

3% to
5%

Php 1,000
to Php
50,000

The repayment of the loan amount is
deducted when final products are sold
There are instances reported where the
supplier purchases the final goods

1.3% to
5%
(month)

Credit check, collateral, existing
business or employment
Application includes basic
documentation: birth certificate,
barangay clearance form
Individual and group lending primarily
to women
Individual loans require a analysis of
the household‘s income (where the
male household head usually acts as the
guarantor)
Group loans also require a prescreening. In this case group members
act as the guarantors for individuals in
case of default
Loans can include a forced savings
component
For larger loans applicants are required
to shown they have an existing
business or are employed

Consumption

Emergency

Informal
lender or
personal loan
(―5/6‖)

“Extra”
Informal
lender or
personal loan

Php 5,000

20%
(month)

Application includes basic
documentation: birth certificate,
barangay clearance form
No application or ―screening‖
requirements.
If the lender has a small shop the
borrower can be required to purchase
items (usually at 2 or 3 times the
market value)

Small
negotiable
amounts

10%
week but
up 40%
month

Full loan amount is usually repaid
within 40 days
Only used by informants in case of
emergencies (and when there is
certainty they will be able to pay within
1 week)

Interest is
collected
weekly
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Levels of indebtedness and ability to pay
While sources of credit continued to be available, respondents systematically reported
increased levels of debt. While the practice of borrowing from multiple sources (“puhunan”) as a coping
mechanism pre-dated the 2009 disasters, respondents indicated that the practice had intensified. Puhunan was
reported in more than half of the sites visited: “Usually those who borrow do not borrow just from one source. If you
borrow Php 2,000 from one source, Php 5,000 from the other, sometimes they all just add up and with that the problem of not
being able to borrow…because what you earn is not enough” […] “While this has long been the practice, it is more aggressive
today. In fact many take this option now.” (Baliuag, Bulacan). Informants reported that households typically had
debts of between Php 10,000 and Php 20,000 at any one time from multiple sources (for small businesses and
household expenses).
Figure 9: Proportion of sites where risky or unsustainable borrowing practices were observed

Reports of at least some households with unpaid debts were found across all 19 sites.
Significant delays in making payments were noted in over half of the areas visited. Informants
systematically reported making every possible effort to ensure debts payments were made on time. In addition
to the penalties charged for late payment, the fear of collectors and the shame of being known within their
communities as someone who did not pay debts, were mentioned as key reasons for trying to make timely
payments. Some respondents could point to examples of community members who had applied for loans
using false information: ―Some people just have their picture taken beside any store that they do not own. This is so they can
use the photo to apply for lending.” (Dona Imelda, Quezon City). The overall perception was, however, that
borrowing was a necessity for the majority of the households and one of the few choices available to meet
basic needs. As discussed in Section 3.1 the few community members receiving wages were most likely to
keep up with their debt payments. Given the very uncertain sources of income of the majority of
respondents, households with large numbers of children or those who had to deal recently with the illness of
a family member were considered particularly vulnerable. Unexpected medical expenses were systematically
described as de-railing informants‘ best efforts to recover.
The inability to repay outstanding debt led to the loss of assets in rural and urban areas. The
risk of losing agricultural land was particularly significant for those farmers who systematically borrowed for
agricultural inputs. They were dependent on good harvests to be able to pay back loans and continue to farm.
Some households have in fact not been able to recover from the debt cycle that began with the damage to
crops caused by Ondoy and Pepeng: ―[…] My observation is that before Ondoy most of the people in the neighborhood
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had farms and they planted sayote. But after the typhoon they lost their farms and were forced to work in another‟s farm19.‖ In
order to make up for the losses incurred in 2009, additional personal loans were taken out with multiple
lenders. Where harvests were bad or were damaged during the rainy season, yields were insufficient for a
subsequent year. In some cases farmers had no choice but to put up their land as collateral for a third loan: ―
The mindset of farmers here is, even if you are already beaten up, you have to gamble again.20 Land was often lost due to
the inability to make payments on all outstanding loans.
Although less prevalent, there were similar
cases of lost assets for households engaged in small
businesses, given the urgent need to secure capital to
restart business activities: “The main challenge to the
community was how to start all over again. Capital to restart the
business was a big problem especially as the capital used for the
former businesses was also loaned. Almost all households whose
primary source of income is small business encountered a problem of
how to pay their existing loans and where to get capital to start
another business.” (Rosales, Pangasinan). The research team
found isolated cases where homes had been used as
collateral for small businesses destroyed by Ondoy and
Pepeng or where they have been sold to raise the funds
necessary to restart a livelihood activity.21

Getting into debt

19

Fifty-two year old Maria ran a
―junk-shop‖ from her home prior to the
2009 disasters. She is married and a
mother of three with several grandchildren. Her husband is ill and her
children have irregular incomes. Prior to
Ondoy, Maria put her house up as
collateral to access a loan. The used the
loan to do some repairs on her home and
the rest of the capital to buy materials for
her business. Ondoy hit at a time when
her shop was full of ―new‖ stock. Her
other sources of income, pigs and rooster
were also lost in the flood. This left her
with no alternative means to make a living
and with a lot of debts to pay. To make
matters more difficult another family
member fell ill after Ondoy, leaving her
with hospital bills to settle: ―The truth is,
our goods were near the river, I was […]
hoping that they would not be carried
away by the floodwaters because they
were a lot of money…At the same time,
my child was brought to the hospital.‖ At
present, Maria works in the waste
management program of the barangay.
She also picks waste, something she had
not done before: ―What am I to do, this is
the only way to earn. Even small things
are important to me. In fact, if there are
pieces of wood, I collect them, tie them
up and sell them.‖ She uses her income to
pay debts and cover daily expenses. When
she has no money, she buys food from
stores on credit and pays them later. She
couldn‘t borrow to start a business
because she has not means to pay (walang

20

pambayad).

In nearly three-quarters of the sites visited,
respondents indicated that they were currently
borrowing for basic consumption needs. Across all
sites visited, informants indicated that loans were intended
to support livelihood activities (buying materials, stock for
small businesses or farming inputs). The practice of
diverting funds from businesses and income generating
activities to cover basic consumption was, however,
widespread in rural and urban areas:“We are fine but still very
much in debt… our income is not enough. Of course we have to
replace the things we lost, the rest (of the loans) for food, for my
children‟s allowance, for school fees.” (Rosales, Pangasinan); ―For
example, someone gets sick, the money allotted for payment of the
debt goes to medicine.” (Palayan, Nueva Ecija)
In over a third of communities visited
households were using loans to pay existing debt.
While the research team observed this practice during the
SIA primarily in rural areas the SIM indicated it was also
now common in four of the urban sites as well.
Tublay, Benguet
San Idelfonso, Bulacan
21 Bustos,Bulacan and Kasiglahan Village 1,(Rizal
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Accumulated debt remained a key obstacle to recovery, significantly limiting households‘ ability to invest in
productive activities: ―This is what happens. If you borrow money and cannot repay, you will borrow from another so you
have money to pay. What happens is that your loans get doubled because the money you used to pay, you borrowed it from
someone else. (Westbank Floodway, Pasig).‖ Any additional income is therefore channeled to the repayment of
debt: “Like the time when my husband had no job, we had to borrow for our needs. The debts accumulated. Like the last time,
we would depend on financial help from his siblings. When the money arrives, we just use it to pay our previous debts. The next
day, we start getting into new debts again.” (Dona Imelda, Quezon City)
3.4 Recommendations from communities

One of the key findings from the discussions with communities was that livelihood support was
often not sustainable. The availability of capital was the key ―missing element‖ in recovery, according to
communities, and critical to enable the recovery of small businesses. Both rural and urban communities also
stressed the importance of skills training for different sub-groups in particular in the areas of product
development and marketing.
Figure 10: Community recommendations on livelihood recovery (number of sites)
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4. Social Relations and Cohesion
4.1 Changes in intra-household relationships
Gender relations
The Social Impacts Analysis conducted in 2009 indicated that the disasters did bring about some
significant changes in gender relations. Ondoy and Pepeng resulted in an increased work burden for
women who took on additional or temporary jobs to supplement household income. As men, in some areas,
began returning to their previous occupations, women were taking responsibility for carrying out or
overseeing home repairs in addition to their existing tasks. Informants also reported, however, that
―women‘s‖ and ―men‘s‖ tasks were performed by both genders in the aftermath of the disaster. A number of
instances were noted where men took over domestic tasks (such as child-care responsibilities) so that women
could earn supplementary income.
The additional burden placed on women was thought by respondents to have decreased once
the reconstruction activities came to an end. Some exceptions to this general pattern were noted in six22
of the 19 sites where the qualitative research module was implemented. In these areas, informants said that
the difficult economic conditions they experienced meant that there was a greater deal of flexibility in the
kind of work men and women did: ―Sometimes it is the father who does the laundry […] It is the mother who oversees the
carabaos23‖ or “If my husband has no work, then he will stay in the house and I will work”24. The research team
observed a perception in these sites that: ―Whatever men can do, so can the women”.25
Women in all affected communities had been responsible for the management of the household
budget, a situation that did not change with the typhoon or with recovery. Women enjoyed a great deal
of respect and recognition within their communities for their entrepreneurial skills: ―When we do the rounds,
selling the catch, there is a higher profit (than when the men sell it)26.‖ Managing family finances became, however,
a more difficult task.
The SIM further indicated that households were increasingly reliant on the income generated by
small businesses and temporary work, primarily undertaken by women, to meet basic consumption
needs (Section 3 above). The research team found a clear concentration of women in a more restricted
number of occupations. These were also typically lower paid and less skilled jobs. Women were more
commonly drawn to home-based activities (such as piece work) that would enable them to continue
performing domestic tasks. The highly uncertain nature of these occupations required women in affected
areas to manage complex and very opportunistic livelihood strategies: “You‟ll have to think of how you can earn.
Like me, I can still work. I know how to cut hair. So when I get to cut the hair of two or three people, I can already buy one kilo
of rice, right? And then afterwards you can sell some items. You can earn more, or you can do manicure. The earnings add up.‖
Four rural or peri-urban communities and two urban sites: Malaban (Laguna), Rosales (Pangasinan), Tublay (Benguet), Palayan
(Nueva Ecija), La Trinidad (Benguet) and Dona Imelda (Quezon City)
23 Palayan,Nueva Ecija
24 Rosales, Pangasinan
25 Tublay, Benguet
26 Santa, Illocos Sur
22
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(Palayan City, Nueva Ecija). Unlike skilled male workers, who have relatively more secure occupations, selfemployed women are more likely to face severe time constraints to combine their income earning and
domestic responsibilities.
Table 12: Self-employment, predominantly male and female occupations (average earnings)

Male

Female
Self-employed: skilled workers

Construction (carpenters, electricians, mason and
painters) – Php 200 to Php 500/day
Jeepney drivers - Php 60 to Php 100/day
Taxi drivers - Php 100 to Php 300/day
Self-employed: unskilled workers
Unskilled construction worker – Php 150/day
Domestic work and laundry services - Php 200 to Php
300/day (irregular – usually twice a week)
Pedi-cab driver -Php 60 to Php 100/day
Tricycle driver - Php 100 to Php 150/day
Sari-sari stores (Php 500, gross value of daily sales)
Home-based beauticians/hair-dressers (irregular income)
Handicrafts/piece work (Php 3.00 to Php 5.00 per piece –
up to Php 50 per day/irregular)

The research team encountered isolated instances27 where the disaster response seemed to
encourage greater engagement by women in community activities: ―They become more active so that they can
help the community.”28 The role played by some women‘s group during disaster response (including in the
distribution of relief assistance) seems to have resulted in a stronger engagement by women in disaster
prevention activities. Women‘s groups were found to be active in flood warning/prevention at community
level and to play a significant role in community mobilization for resettlement working with local authorities.
In addition, the livelihood activities promoted during the recovery phase and in particular the group lending
practices followed by MFIs in 15 of the 19 research sites created additional opportunities for women to
undertake collective activities and join community-based associations. No evidence was collected by the
research team on whether group membership had an impact on intra-household relationships. Limited
informant feedback indicated that important household decisions (such as whether or not to relocate) were
primarily taken by the male household head.29 Reports of women‘s role in the 2009 disaster response and
recovery having translated into greater decision-making power within the household were found in only one
of the research sites.30

Tublay (Benguet) andBaliuag (Bulacan)
Tublay, Benguet
29 WestBank Floodway, Pasig City
30 Dona Imelda, Quezon City
27
28
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New roles for youth
The SIA noted that youth across all research sites expressed a desire to contribute further to
recovery efforts. This emerging trend was confirmed by the SIM findings, with three key areas where
significant changes in inter-generational relations were noted.
First, young people contributed more to the household budget by taking on temporary work
and in some cases by leaving school or vocational training courses to work full time. This pattern was
observed in 13 of the 19 sites covered by the qualitative module. Although working youth had been a feature
of community life in some rural areas prior to Ondoy and Pepeng, respondents systematically indicated an
increase in the number of young people taking up work after the 2009 disasters.

Figure 11: Youth taking on additional work (number
of sites)

Figure 12: Types of work more frequently
mentioned by young people (number of sites)

Secondly, this seems to have been accompanied by a change in communities‟ and
households‟ perception of young people: “Before the male youths just hung around the neighborhood to chat and
drink. Now, they are working. There are no more bums here.‖ 31 Young people seem to be generally more valued for
their ability to generate additional income in the majority of the research sites: “The difference is that they are
helping us this time because we no longer have work. […]. They carry gravel and there is somebody constructing a house.32”
Earnings are commonly shared with parents to meet basic consumption needs, in spite of some isolated
exceptions to this pattern: “The children‟s addiction to the internet got worse. […] Even the poorest children, instead of
helping their parents, they use their money for internet use.”33
This notion that young people were more trustworthy did not translate into greater voice for
youth in decision-making at the household or at the community level. A common concern expressed
by youth was the limited attention given to their concerns and perspectives on disaster preparedness and
relocation at community level. In spite of what they felt was their greater awareness of environmental
vulnerability, crucial household preparedness measures their concerns tended not to be addressed. Informants
in some areas considered that the election period was the only exception to this general rule.34

Dona Imelda,Quezon City
Tublay, Benguet
33 Malaban,Laguna
34 Bustos,Bulacan
31
32
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Limited changes in residence patterns
The general trend of families staying together in the immediate aftermath of the disaster
observed during the SIA continued during the recovery phase. Where migration had been adopted as
a coping strategy, the household tended to move together35: ― I had one neighbor, their house was submerged in
knee-level mud. It takes almost two months for the mud to dry up. They left for Batangas.36‖ There were, however,
significant exceptions to this pattern. Households in resettlement sites and peri-urban areas reported more
frequently that some family members resided close to their place of employment and came home periodically
only. This was the case in Southville 4 (Laguna) where residents unable to afford the cost of daily commuting,
stayed with relatives or rent rooms in Metro Manila to be able to maintain their previous jobs. A similar
pattern was observed in Southville 5A where the research team implemented the quantitative research
module. The findings will be presented in Section 6 below. In addition, there instances noted where children
had been sent to live with relatives in safer locations. This was particularly true of households who consider
their areas to remain highly vulnerable to disasters: ― I sent my two children to Binangonan because it‟s difficult here.
Just a little rain and it floods.‖37

4.2 Community cohesion during the recovery phase

Mutual assistance is provided through smaller, closer-knit, social networks
The Social Impacts Analysis conducted in 2009 had indicated that collaborative behavior was
widespread among affected communities. Not only had respondents supported each other during
rescue operations, but limited resources such as food or clothing had been pooled. Residents took turns
in taking care of each others‘ children so that parents could take advantage of temporary work
opportunities. They had also systematically contributed to the distribution of relief goods. Civil society
and community-based organizations were mobilized, primarily in urban areas and played a critical role
during the relief phase. Informants also reported how collaborative behavior had been extended to cover
the initial rehabilitation of infrastructure.
Instances of community-level recovery activities were overall rarer. Informants systematically
reported that after the initial efforts for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, community members
provided support almost exclusively to their extended family and smaller social networks (including
neighbors). These networks were important in providing information about recovery programs and
potential livelihood activities and replaced the broader community as the main focus of collaborative
behavior in the medium term. This trend was noted in both rural and urban areas as well as in formal and
informal settlements: “Each to his own work.” (Nueva Ecija).

Tublay (Benguet), Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija) and Baliuag (Bulacan)
Cabanatuan,Nueva Ecija
37 Malaban, Laguna
35
36
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Figure 13: Community-based recovery activities (number of
sites)

Figure 14: Community-based recovery activities (number of
sites, excluding evacuation areas)

Where instances of community-wide support mechanisms were observed, informants
reported they had already been strong prior to the disasters. This was primarily observed in rural
and peri-urban areas: ―For example if I have already fixed my house and my neighbor has not and there may be
children at risk, some help is given.‖ 38 The research team found an isolated case where respondents
considered that this practice of bayanihan had intensified after 2009.39 The overall perception was that
these mutual help practices such as bayanihan or batares (community farm labor) were less frequent at the
time of the assessment. While previously it had been possible to request for help from your neighbors to
work in your field by providing them with their meals, ―labor is now for hire… it‟s because life in the past year
has gotten harder‖.40
Community-based organizations support recovery efforts.
In Doña Imelda, Quezon City, a group of young people formed an organization,
in which those who are already employed and working contributed money to a
fund used to help those greatly affected by the typhoon. At the time of the
assessment they were giving their collections to a church for civic activities. A 15year-old informant described their activities: ― They help, they work. And then they save
to give money to those affected by the disaster. They chip in money and they give the money to the
church‖.
In San Fabian, the Pangasinan Community Women‘s Incorporated, supported
recovery efforts in the area by paying for the electrical bills of the barangay
elementary school for more than a year. The organization also provided cash
incentives to students and supported 47 elementary and secondary student
scholars.

Baliuag, Bulacan
Palayan, Nueva Ecija
40 Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
38
39
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Emerging tensions and insecurity
Increased tensions within the community and greater levels of insecurity were observed in a
reduced number of sites, most of them urban (Figure 15). Overall, relationships within villages and
urban neighborhoods remained positive.
Figure 15: Sites reporting emerging tensions or increases in crime and violence

In communities with a significant number of new settlers there was a tendency to attribute
law and order problems to newcomers, informal settlers or neighboring communities. This pattern,
identified by the research team during the SIA, continued in the post-disaster recovery phase. Social support
networks and solidarity mechanisms existed mostly within smaller sub-groups, connected by kinship ties or
by the fact that particular groups of households had moved into an area at the same time. The changes in
community composition brought about by the disasters, with some informal settlers leaving danger areas and
moving into new neighborhoods did, therefore, have some impacts on community dynamics. This was noted
in Kasiglahan Village 1 (KV1) (Rizal) and in Wawa (Taguig) and was often expressed in terms of a ―us‖ and
―them‖ divide. In Wawa, residents explained the split within their community between longer-time resident
―clans‖ and ―migrants‖. Although familiarity between the two groups developed over time according to key
informants, the trustworthiness of migrants is considered variable.41 Some moved into the area to do
temporary work in construction, for example, but remained ―strangers‖. A similar pattern was noted in
Camacho Phase II (Marikina), where petty crime is attributed to the neighboring Balubad area. Interestingly,
in West Bank Floodway (Pasig), residents considered that the law and order situation had improved because
settlers on the river-bed had moved following the disasters. Informants and participants in FDGs reported a
subsequent decrease in theft and public disturbances.

Reports from households who had moved into new areas following the disasters exemplify the difficulties sometimes
experienced in fitting into new villages and neighborhoods. This was the case in La Trinidad (Benguet), where
respondents who had relocated to a new area complained about their new neighbors not wanting to share their watersupply and cutting their water hoses.
41
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This pattern of sub-group allegiance can be particularly important in some communities
where kinship ties between constituents and local authorities (barangay councilors, for example)
plays an important role in conflict resolution. This is the case in Wawa (Taguig) where conflict issues
among resident ―clans‖ (especially where they involve youth) are more readily resolved through mediation
with the family.
Where an increase in crime and violence was noted, respondents indicated links to the difficult
post-disaster economic situation. The group considered most at risk was youth, with informants stressing
that the greater number of out-of-school youths or of young men without jobs had a negative impact on the
overall sense of security42 in the community: “Most of time they hang out in the streets, creating a risk atmosphere for
women.” In particular, respondents stressed the linkages between youth unemployment and: (i) increased drug
use, (ii) increased gang violence, and (iii) in isolated instances of more violent crime (―hold-ups‖).43
Informants also highlighted that the living conditions in their areas (narrow, maze-like street lay-out, lack of
street lighting) made it more difficult for police to control crime and violence. Barangay initiatives to ensure
better security conditions (including hiring of night watchmen) or to ―drive away drug pushers‖ and ―put
addicts into rehabilitation‖ were also noted.44
Beyond changes in community composition and the stress caused by the difficulties in
earning an income in affected communities, greater insecurity was noted by groups still in
temporary accommodation. Evacuation sites (such as Tent City in Botolan, Zambales) have now taken on
the appearance of semi-permanent housing. While more durable roofs and partitions have been installed by
some households, respondents in these areas highlighted their vulnerability to theft: ―Fences have been raised
because of the drunkards outside; some have removed their tents for more space, in the past it was just a tent, now it has fences.”
Importantly they stressed that their current living conditions put women and children at risk, with reports of
violence noted in the resettlement site.45
The SIA indicated that the distribution of relief assistance had led to some increase in tension
within communities as targeting was seen in some areas as privileging some sub-groups and/or
households with linkages to local government. While the SIM highlighted issues with the targeting of
recovery assistance particularly linked to the political ―instrumentalization‖ of assistance, there were no
reports of increased conflict as a result. These issues are explored in greater detail in Section 6.

This was observed in Wawa (Taguig), KV1 (Rizal) WestBank Floodway (Pasig), Camacho Phase II (Marikina) and
Southville 4 A (Laguna)
43 This was noted in Wawa. Taguig City
44 KV1, Rizal
45 It is important to note that the SIM was not designed to assess the impact of the disaster on instances of violence
against women within the household. While information was collected on the role of women in decision-making at
household level, an understanding of violence against women would require a different approach and methodology
given the sensitive nature of the topic.
42
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4.3 Community recommendations to improve social cohesion

Community recommendations focused on improving communication among sub-groups, LGUs, CSOs
and POs and on promoting greater civic engagement. Suggestions came primarily from urban areas.

Figure 16: Community suggestion to improve social cohesion (number of sites)
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5. Resettlement Options and Housing Conditions

In addition to the qualitative module implemented in 19 study sites, the research team sought to
gain a better understanding of the current living conditions of households that had been resettled
following Ondoy and Pepeng. A short survey was, therefore, implemented to provide information on the
impacts of ―in-city‖ versus ―off-city‖ resettlement in Eusebio Bliss and Southville 5A, respectively. The
following section begins with an overview of community perceptions of resettlement using data from the
qualitative module. It then provides a more detailed account of the recovery trajectories of households
resettled according to the two different approaches mentioned above. The comparison focuses primarily on
the issues of: (i) access to livelihoods and employment, and (ii) affordability of housing46.
Participants‘ responses regarding resettlement and housing conditions should be understood in light
of the status (formal/informal site) of their current place of residence, as outline in Table 13 below.
Table 13: Security of tenure in research sites
Formal sites

Informal or mixed
communities
Barangay Malaban, Biñan,
Laguna

Evacuation areas
(temporary shelter)
Barangay Ambassador
(Tublay, Benguet)

Barangay Wawa, Taguig
City
Barangay Caudillo,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija

Barangay Maybunga, Pasig

Barangay Carael (Botolan,
Zambales)

Barangay Sapang Buho,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija

Barangay Puguis, La
Trinidad, Benguet

Barangay Poblacion, Baliuag,
Bulacan

Eusebio BLISS,
Maybunga, Pasig City49
Kasiglahan Village 1,
Barangay San Jose,
Montalban, Rizal

Barangay Pulong Tamo,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan
Barangay Natividad,
Naguilian, La Union

Barangay Poblacion, Bustos,
Bulacan
Barangay East Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan
Barangay Longos Central,
San Fabian, Pangasinan

Resettlement sites

Formal communities47

Southville 5A, Langkiwa,
Biñan, Laguna48

Tabucolan, Santa,
Ilocos, Sur

Southville 4, Sta. Rosa City,
Laguna
Gawad Kalinga Camacho
Phase II, Barangay Nangka,
Marikina City

Barangay Doña Imelda,
Quezon City

Responses collected through the qualitative module from resettlement sites (as outlined in Table 13) were used to
complement the survey data.
46

This category includes sites formally established by government as well as communities with relative security of tenure
and long-standing presence in their current location (in rural areas)
48 Covered by the qualitative research module
49 Covered by the qualitative research module
47
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5.2 Community views of housing and relocation assistance

5.2.1

Assistance received

Cash and in-kind support was available but often insufficient to cover all affected households
Reports from participating communities on the provision of housing assistance were mixed. Inkind and cash assistance had been provided to all significantly affected sites (Figure 17). The main sources of
support were: (i) local government units (through emergency cash grants and in kind support); (ii) DSWD
primarily through its Core Shelter program; and (iii) the National Housing Authority providing support for
reconstruction activities as well as land and housing for resettlement. Civil society organizations played a
critical role primarily in rural areas. The most frequently mentioned source of support was the Philippines
Red Cross, which extended in-kind and cash assistance (Figure 18).
However, participants systematically reported that housing assistance had not been sufficient to
address the needs of all affected households in the community.50 Segments in these communities
consistently reported not receiving sufficient assistance for housing reconstruction:“ Here we are, still
impoverished, our house turned upside down during the typhoon. So you can see my dilapidated house because of the absence of
money to buy materials, instead of buying household needs we would rather buy food. So here we are making use of makeshift
sacks just to cover the house.” 51
Respondents highlighted delays between the initial needs assessment and the provision of
assistance, with instances noted where the support did not arrive: ―Here people went from house to house and
checked the damage of the house and the capacity of the owner to repair it. But they just did interviews. I saw no help coming in
here in our place. We just thought we probably didn‟t qualify but if you look, the houses of our neighbors were totally wrecked.
But nothing […] they took photos and then nothing. […] A year has passed and then nothing. Until it was my neighbors
themselves who took care of the repairs, because they couldn‟t wait anymore.”52
Figure 17: Assistance for housing reconstruction
(number of sites)

Figure 18: Main sources of assistance (number of sites)

The only exception to this pattern was Ambassador (Tublay, Benguet)
San Fabian, Pangasinan
52 GK Camacho, Phase II, Marikina
50
51
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Isolated cases of households remaining in evacuation areas
Residents in two study sites, Botolan in Zambales and Tublay in Benguet, 53 remained in
temporary shelter two years after they were moved from their homes. Feedback from residents
highlighted how living conditions and access to services had deteriorated over time in these areas. This was
the case in Tent City in Botolan, Zambales, where residents stressed unsafe and cramped living conditions
and deteriorating sanitation. As temporary support measures were phased out, access to basic services was
also becoming increasingly difficult. Free transportation for school children and free access to electricity for
example had been suspended: ―It is problematic because there are floods during school season and no vehicle goes there (to
school).‖ Electricity, which had been “free until after elections when we were cut off,” has become costly, with
residents now ―shar(ing) connections, extensions.”
Residents attributed their stalled recovery to difficulties in securing a suitable resettlement site
and to slow progress with the needed construction work for new developments. The situation was
particularly precarious in Botolan, where new claims had been made on portions of the resettlement site,
causing significant delays in the process. In addition, the community observed a general lack of consultation.
They said they had not been able to fully engage in the process that led to the selection of the site. The
proposed resettlement site for the relocation of Tent City is on higher ground and an hour away by foot from
the town center. Residents indicated they were not in favor of moving and would rather be resettled in lowerlying areas for better access to basic services and livelihoods. The lack of health facilities, livelihoods, potable
water, and electricity in the proposed resettlement area were also put forward as causes for concern: ―You
cannot call what is happening to us as recovery. If you think about it, true recovery is in Barangay Carael. What has happened
to us, this is temporary. If Tent 1 is temporary, many of us youth, men, have helped build pumps and toilets. Here in Tent 1.
But this is not recovery. Our recovery should be in Barangay Carael itself.”
Importantly, the research team noted that limited information on the proposed relocation
process was available to affected households in Tublay. In particular, while community members
expected construction work at the relocation site to be completed within a few months, local government
indicated that construction would be completely finalized within two years.

5.2.2

Reluctance to relocate

The qualitative research module indicated that communities in 12 study sites were reluctant to
resettle in areas outside their barangay.54 The main reason put forward for this unwillingness to
move was the risk of not being able to find a suitable livelihood in the resettlement areas. This was
true for respondents that engaged in wage work: ―My brother sends me to school and there are only the two of us. He
works just near the barangay, If we will relocate, he will lose his job”.55 This was the sentiment as well as for those with

187 households in Botolan, Zambales and 18 households in Tublay, Benguet
The analysis did not cover formal resettlement areas where the question was not applicable
55 Dona Imelda, Quezon City
53
54

Page 55 of 80

small businesses: “ It is possible that in the relocation site, you will not be allowed to put up a store. It depends on the area
too. It is ideal that your store is along the main road instead of at the back section of an area.”56
In some sites where partial ―off-city‖ resettlement had already taken place, respondents referred to
examples of former neighbors who had recently returned to their previous community, as they were unable to
earn any income in the resettlement area. This pattern was observed in four of the five sites covered by the
qualitative assessment where ―off-city‖ resettlement had taken place. This information was provided to the
research team as an illustration of how the risk of losing one‘s livelihood was as pressing a concern as the
safety in their current place of residence: “Even some of those of have actually relocated eventually returned to Dona
Imelda, because they found it hard to secure employment or livelihoods in the resettlement area” […] “ […] without livelihoods
we will still go back here. We will just die in the relocation site.57”
Figure 19: Communities reluctant to relocate (nb of sites)

Figure 20: Concerns regarding relocation (nb of sites)

Worries about losing their current social support mechanisms were also critical. The qualitative
module noted the preference of residents, should they need to be moved to areas outside their barangay, to
move together with their neighbors. This would minimize the challenge of adjusting to a new social setting
and forming new relationships with host communities: “Moving to a new resettlement site might entail problems that
have to do with quarrelsome neighbors” […] “ How will you be able to start a new life well when you are not used to the new
environment?”58
This was followed by concerns about access to services in resettlement areas. With schools and
health centers not always available in proposed resettlement sites, respondents expressed concern that the
cost of transport to be able to access basic services would be too high: “Many of our students had to quit school
because they didn‟t have money for transportation.”59 The availability of water, electricity connections, adequate
sanitation and waste disposal was also frequently mentioned.
The perception of physical risk in their current locations and in the proposed resettlement areas
played an important role in communities‟ unwillingness to move. On the one hand, there was an overall
perception that some degree of flooding is part of ―normal life‖. In some instances there is an underestimation of the potential dangers in the current location and a degree of pride in having survived previous
disasters: ―You were not born yet when we went through more ferocious typhoons. But here we are, still alive!‖60 This pattern
was observed by the research team even areas that suffered heavy losses and where the risk of recurrent
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija
Dona Imelda, Quezon City
58 Palayan City, Neuva Ecija
59 Rosales, Pangasinan where a proportion of the affected households were relocated eight km out of town.
60 Older male informants (Santa, Ilocos Sur) in response to social worker‘s advice that they would be safer in the
proposed relocation site.
56
57
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flooding is high. This is the case of Little Kibungan (La Trinidad, Benguet), classified as a danger zone in
2009. Difficulties in securing a resettlement site meant that a number of households had returned to their
previous place of residence.61 Having adapted to recurrent disasters and respondents were, overall, more
willing to take the risk of living with instances of flooding than to take the risk of moving to areas where
potential sources of income are unknown or uncertain: ―[…] we are already used to life here.‖62 On the other
hand, participants in the study highlighted that proposed resettlement sites would still be affected by the same
risks they currently face in the areas where they reside (typhoons, flooding and landslides): “The Rodriguez
resettlement is located along the fault line and they expect us to move there? That is why we do not concede. They will let us die
there. They will take us out of the danger zone and move us to an earthquake zone?63
The difficulties in identifying suitable resettlement solutions and the perception of risk
described above meant that, in isolated cases, vulnerable households had returned to areas which
were classified as danger zones. This was observed in Westbank Floodway (Pasig) and La Trinidad
(Benguet). In the latter case, electricity connections had been cut temporarily (as a deterrent to households
wishing to return to their area of origin). They were, however, restored and residents allowed to go back as
alternative sites for relocation had not been identified. In the case of Westbank Floodway, the difficulties in
securing a livelihood in the off-city resettlement area proposed for residents (Calauan), meant that a
significant number of households returned to their place of origin in spite of the high risk of further flooding.
Household aspirations and resettlement – Baliuag (Bulacan)
A review of community perspectives regarding resettlement highlighted primarily concerns about possible
moves and living conditions. The qualitative module did not yield a great deal of information about the perceived
benefits of resettlement. Interviews conducted with resettled households in Baliuag, Bulacan did, however, provide
some insights on how resettled households aspired to better family relations and a better future for their children in
their new places of residence.64 Interviewees in the area had moved to two different sites: Starville I (a Gawad
Kalinga site) and Starville II (supported by the Red Cross). They reported significant challenges in earning a living
but stressed the marked improvements in living conditions and in the health of household members: ―My child does
not get fever anymore”. “First of all, it is a very nice place and you will not hear cursing and have people drinking as in the squatter
area.” “There has been a very big change because you can avoid alcohol and even cigarette smoking. It‟s as if many of these vices
disappeared and a great change has been made. My husband has changed. Here his friends are more reliable, there they are into drugs.
It was all there: vices, stealing, and I said to myself I don‟t want to raise my children in a place like that. So when this chance came, I
said, I will not let it go”. “ I really exerted a lot of effort to move my children here. They said life was quiet here and I have three girls
and a boy and I saw that in our previous area, it was all gambling. My husband thinks that here, although life is hard, it is good and
there is no fear that my children will grow up around vices.”

5.3 Impact of resettlement: “in-city” (Eusebio Bliss) and “off-city” (Southville 5A)
This under-estimation of the risk in some areas was also accompanied by a limited understanding of the impact that
additional infrastructure can have on environmental vulnerability. Informants in Little Kibungan (La Trinidad, Benguet),
for example, indicated their preference for ―government to clear the mountainous portion‖ of the area to minimize the
danger of land-slides, rather than relocating.
62 Cabanatuan, (Nueva Ecija)
63 Dona Imelda, Quezon City
64This is in line with the way in which National Housing Authority officials participating in the study described their role
in the resettlement process: “To give people the option to be in a relatively, better - admittedly not yet ideal - community”. Interview
with Arch. Luis Bacamante, Office of the Assistant General Manager, National Housing Authority, May 30, 2011
61
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Move to resettlement sites resulted in overall improvements in living conditions
The short surveys conducted in both resettlement sites show a clear improvement in the
conditions of resettled households in terms of living space and quality of construction of housing
units (Table 14). On average, a household in both survey sites has five to six members, with one-family
households occupying most of the units in Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss (89% and 81% respectively). Only
a small proportion of households (8%) have been relocated to smaller housing units, with the vast majority of
residents now having bigger living spaces than before. Resettled residents in both sites now live in concrete
homes (made of heavy materials), although units at the Eusebio Bliss are significantly better in terms of
finishing. This is a marked improvement for both communities, in particular for Eusebio Bliss, where twothirds of the respondents reported that their previous houses were made of light materials.
Table 14: Improvement in living conditions (off-city and in-city resettlement)

Living
Conditions

Southville 5A (“off-city”)
Prior to resettlement Resettlement area

Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”)
Prior to resettlement Resettlement area

Average size of
homes
Type of
occupancy

26.6 sq m

34 sq m

29.6 sq m

36 sq m

Not known

89% single family
9% two families
2% three families

Not known

81% single family
11% two families
5% three families

Construction
materials

43% homes built using
concrete

Average household
size (five to six
members)
100% concrete homes

57% homes made of
light materials
Access to green
spaces
Access to safe
sanitation
Access to
electricity
Garbage
disposal services
Access to piped
water

32% homes built using
concrete

Average household
size (five to six
members)
100% concrete home

40%

38%

68.8% homes made of
light materials
56%

94%

100%

86%

100%

86%

100%

81%

100%

100%

100%

82.5%

100%

54%

13%

73%

79%

6%

Page 58 of 80

For households relocated “in-city” (Eusebio Bliss) the improvements in living conditions
implied, however, losing access to green spaces around their homes. While more than half of the
households maintained small gardens in their previous place of residence, 94% reported not having
any green areas around their homes in the resettlement site. In Southville 5A, located near a rice field and a
row housing development, the situation was markedly different, with 38% homes retaining access to green
spaces.
Most resettled households had access to electricity, water, and garbage disposal in their
previous place of residence, but resettlement did ensure that there was total coverage of electricity,
garbage disposal services, and access to safe sanitation. In Southville 5A, electricity connections became
available a month after the residents arrived from Marikina City. Before and after Ondoy and Pepeng, all
surveyed households in Southville 5A were being serviced by the garbage collection system of the local
government unit. The situation was similar for households in Eusebio Bliss. Before being resettled, only a
small number of households (7.5%) were not covered by the garbage collection service. Similarly, all resettled
households now have access to safe sanitation (water-sealed toilets). This constitutes a moderate
improvement from the pre-resettlement situation.

Some challenges remain
Access to piped water constituted an exception as improvements were not noted in the
resettlement sites. Access to piped water remained at nearly the same level for residents in Eusebio Bliss.
For households in Southville 5A access to piped water has decreased significantly with only 13% now
reporting access. Water connections in the resettlement site were in fact introduced only in May 2011.
Furthermore, households were required to pay a connection fee of PhP 4,500.00 each. Most households
therefore continued to get water for domestic use from deep wells. The move to Southville 5A also meant
additional expenses on drinking water. For instance, 90% of the households in Southville 5A reported buying
bottled water, compared to 12% in their original settlement, where the main source of drinking water (77%)
was MWSS. In addition, those residents in Southville 5A with access to piped water expressed concerns about
its quality.65
The findings from the qualitative research module provide some additional insights
regarding overall living condition in resettlement sites. Homeowners in Baliuag (Bulacan) and Rosales
(Pangasinan), for example, reported still needing support in accessing basic services (electricity and piped
water connections). The issue was not always the availability of the service, but rather, households‘ ability to
cover the costs of the new connections as well as utility bills. In Rosales, respondents clarified that electricity
connections were the responsibility of the homeowners (i.e. not provided as part of site development) and
that they were unable to afford access. Neighbors often shared access to electrical connection through the

65

The qualitative module highlighted similar issues for the resettled community in Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Before Ondoy, community members drew water for both drinking and domestic uses from deep wells. Those in the
resettlement site, however, had concerns about the quality of the water in the area after cases of diarrhea among children
were observed in May 2011. The number of deep wells was also considered insufficient for the number of users.
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―tapping‖ system (an informal ―sub-metering‖ system). Most of the households in the Rosales resettlement
site reported using candles and gas lamps.

Access to employment and higher cost of living
Access to livelihood opportunities remained a challenge in all of the resettlement sites.
Nevertheless, the adverse effects of resettlement were less visible in the “in-city” resettlement site
(Table 15). The survey indicated that in the off-city resettlement site (Southville 5A), two out of three
households experienced a decrease in income. In comparison, a relatively smaller but still very significant
proportion of households experienced a similar reduction in income (49%) in Eusebio Bliss.66
Table 15: Access to livelihoods and social support networks (off-city and in-city resettlement)
Southville 5A (“off-city”)

Households reporting
decreased income
Changes in transport
expenditures
Mostly cost of housing
(amortization)
Households where all
member live together
Households reporting
difficulties in accessing
support from social
networks
Households approach
LGU officials for support

Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”)

Pre-Resettlement
-

Post-Resettlement
72%

Pre-Resettlement
-

-

Longer commute
reported
Php 250

-

Post-Resettlement
49%
No significant changes
Php 1,500 to 1,900

93%

63%

90%

90%

9%

35%

14%

14%

3%

9%

9%

7%

The location of the resettlement site was not, however, the sole determinant of access to
employment and livelihoods. The education level and the skill set of community members were also
important factors. In Southville 5A, the survey indicated that more than two-thirds (69.1%) of respondents
of working age were unskilled. Their educational attainment was also low. About one in every four completed
high school (23.9%) and only 2% were college graduates. The more common skills possessed by community
members were carpentry (4.8%), cooking (3.3%), and driving (2.4%). Skilled workers, particularly in
construction reported greater ease in finding jobs Biñan or in nearby municipalities of Laguna. In general, it
was small business owners and the self-employed in low skilled jobs (e.g. tricycle/pedicab-driving, providing
laundry services, working as stay-out domestic helpers) who had the most difficulties adjusting to life in
Southville 5A.

A relatively small proportion of residents reported an increase in income (19% of households in Eusebio Bliss and 8%
in Southville 5A).
66
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The location of the resettlement site affected not only households‟ ability to earn an income
but also their cost of living. Increased costs of transportation to and from school for the children, to work
and to access to health services were frequently mentioned in Southville 5A. Most young people did in fact
find employment as mall employees in Marikina City, which resulted in a three-hour (one way) commute
from home to their workplaces. A similar pattern was observed through the qualitative module in all ―offcity‖ resettlement areas. Resettled households in Rosales (Pangasinan), for example, had to travel about nine
kilometers back to their previous place of residence to earn a living: “One problem that we have in Balingkanaway is
the distance. It‟s farther from the town and transportation is an additional daily expense.‖
While a similar pattern was not observed in Eusebio Bliss, significantly higher amortization
placed a heavy burden on household finances in “in-city” resettlement. While monthly payments range
between Php 1,500 to Php 1,900 in Eusebio Bliss, households in Southville 5A reported paying Php 250.

The social cost of resettlement
In addition, there were certain social costs associated with resettlement. In the surveyed study
sites, there was a reduction in the number of households whose members stayed together after
resettlement. This was particularly high in Southville 5A. Households reported that in the vast majority of
cases (93%) all household members had lived together before Ondoy. However, only 63% did so after
resettlement. In contrast, in Eusebio Bliss, where households have been resettled in the city, there were no
changes in household living arrangements (Table 15). This marked difference in living arrangements between
the two sites is mainly attributed to the fact that most resettled residents of Southville 5A kept their jobs in
Marikina City. Working members of the family stayed with relatives or rented spaces in Marikina in order to
be near their place of work.
Resettlement has also had an impact on households‟ ability to ask for assistance from informal
networks. Again, the impact was the strongest for households resettled “off-city” where a third of
households in Southville 5A (35%) reported difficulties in finding assistance for their daily needs. 67
For 19% of households relatives were the main source of support.68 In addition, a larger proportion of
households now approached barangay officials for support although the overall number of households
resorting to such help remained small (from 3% to 9%). In Eusebio Bliss, networks of assistance remained
intact. The number of those who had difficulties in accessing assistance from their social networks remained
the same before and after Ondoy (14%). Overall, relatives remained the main source of support for nearly
half of the respondents.69 The proportion of households approaching local government units for support did
not change significantly either: 9% and 7% before and after Ondoy, respectively.
The overall perception of risk did not change significantly following resettlement, with the
majority of households still reporting a sense of insecurity in new current place of residence. Overall
63% of households in Southville 5A considered their current place of residence to be dangerous (compared
This is compared to 9% pre-disaster and to 14% who report being in a similar situation in Eusebio Bliss.
Compared to 37% before the disaster
69 56% before Ondoy and 55% after the disaster
67
68
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to 65% pre-Ondoy). Similarly there was no noticeable change in the overall perception of danger in Eusebio
Bliss (from 79% pre-Ondoy to 75% post-Ondoy). The main sources of danger mentioned in both sites did
change after resettlement, however. Flooding was the most commonly mentioned source of danger for
households in both areas in their previous place of residence. This was no longer the case at the time of the
assessment. Although natural disasters were still frequently mentioned, they were now of a different sort and
with crime and violence featuring prominently. In Southville 5A, the most commonly mentioned risk was
that posed by thieves, followed by typhoons, and by gang violence. The most commonly mentioned dangers
in Eusebio Bliss were the threat of earthquakes, building stability (the capacity of their homes to withstand an
earthquake), followed by gang violence.
Both the SIA and the SIM‟s qualitative modules highlighted that community cohesion in some
of the study sites was challenging for particular sub-groups or factions. Households tended to retain
stronger bonds to others who relocated from the same areas, at the same time. Collaborative behavior across
these groups was therefore rarer with communities being quicker to attribute negative behavior or instances
of conflict to ‗other‖ sub-groups. The trend observed during the qualitative study was confirmed in Southville
5A where those resettled from Marikina City pointed to households resettled to the same area from Tondo as
the ones ―causing the troubles in the settlement‖.

Limited access to information about resettlement options
Data collected through the SIM (both from the qualitative and quantitative modules) indicated
that information regarding resettlement was inadequate or unavailable during the relocation and
resettlement of affected households. For most Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss respondents, their
resettlement after Ondoy was their first change of residence (97% and 96%, respectively). In Southville 5A,
the main reasons cited by respondents for the transfer was the loss of their houses due to the flood caused by
Ondoy (66%) and the declaration of the previous place of residence as a danger zone and consequent
demolition of houses (21%). A similar situation was observed in Eusebio Bliss were 69% of respondents
moved as their previous place of residence was declared a danger zone.
The SIM found a number of gaps regarding the information available to residents on the
conditions of resettlement and cost of housing in the new sites (Table 16). In both study sites, the LGUs
and their various offices (e.g. Marikina Settlements Office, Pasig City‘s Urban Poor Affairs Office) were the
main providers of information. A small number of households (approximately one in ten residents in both
Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss) reported not having been given any information at all regarding
resettlement. Among the remainder, the research team found that a significant proportion did not have
critical information prior to resettlement (including on the location of the resettlement site, cost of housing
and payment schemes). A similar trend was observed through the qualitative module, with respondents in
Southville 4 A for example referring to their lack of understanding of the contract they entered into for the
amortization of their housing units. They referred to their signature on the contract as: “hostage signature.”
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Table 16: Gaps in information about the resettlement process (percentage of households)

Awareness of resettlement
requirement and qualification
criteria
Informed of the advantages of
resettlement
Informed of the cost of housing
units and payment schemes
Informed of facilities in
resettlement sited
Informed of location of
resettlement site

Southville 5A (“offcity”)

Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”)

22%

11%

76%

49%

52%

66%

31%

15%

40%

13%

In spite of these critical gaps, most households considered the information conveyed helpful
(74% of the households in Southville 5A and 86% in Eusebio Bliss). In the two study sites, information
about the advantages of having one‘s own house was considered the most helpful advice provided (30% and
15% in Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss, respectively). For households moving to Eusebio Bliss, information
on the relocation site (10%) and on-site facilities (8%) were the two other most important sets of information.
For those resettled in Southville 5A, information on the payment scheme and its accompanying rules and
regulations (15%) and assurances that the resettlement site was free of flooding (14%) were considered the
most useful information provided. The important role played by the LGU in providing assistance during
resettlement was also noted by the households, the majority of which report receiving assistance from the
LGU (69% in Southville 5A; 60% in Eusebio Bliss). However, a still significant number of those who moved
to Southville 5A resettlement site (23%) also reported that they relied solely on the help of family members.
Given the lack of information about the resettlement process, it was therefore significant that
a large proportion of households attributed the decision to relocate primarily to the local government
unit (35% in Southville 5A; 21% in Eusebio Bliss). The decision to move was only considered a joint
decision between spouses in approximately a third of the cases in both sites.70 A smaller proportion of
respondents reported that the decision to move was made by the household head (16% Southville 5A; 19%
Eusebio Bliss).

70

27% in Southville 5A and 30% in Eusebio Bliss

Page 63 of 80

Deciding whether to stay
The majority of respondents (74% in Southville 5A; 61% in Eusebio Bliss) were no longer
planning to leave their current place of residence. This was primarily due to the opportunity of having
their own homes in the resettlement sites. For the remaining households, while living conditions had
improved overall, limited access to employment (in Southville 5A) and the high cost of amortization (in
Eusebio Bliss) meant that moving out remained an alternative. The lack of employment of opportunities was
mentioned by over a third of households in Southville 5A (35%). To a lesser extent the still limited access to
water and electricity (8%) and difficulties in fulfilling payment requirements for housing units (5%) were also
reported. The situation was quite different in Eusebio Bliss where a third of the households (31%) referred to
difficulties in making payments on their housing units and to their desire to own their own land for the main
reason to move. In both these areas those considering or planning to move would prefer to live close to their
previous place of residence.
Given that a significant number of residents (particularly in Eusebio Bliss) had problems
with the housing payment scheme in place, what did residents of resettlement sites consider as the
most suitable payment arrangements? Among those considering moving out of Southville 5A, 44% would
prefer a longer payment period for the housing loan, 28% indicated the need for a housing grant, while 16%
requested a lowering of interest rates on the housing loan. In Eusebio Bliss, residents indicated a preference
for longer payment period for the housing loan (36%), a grant (32%), and a Gawad Kalinga arrangement
(11%) where the provision of housing is accompanied by a strong social mobilization component.
Interestingly, in spite of difficulties with making housing payments, almost all households reported preferring
ownership to rental or lease arrangements. In Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss, only 1% and 4%, respectively
were considering rental arrangements. For this small minority in Eusebio Bliss, renting was a viable
alternative given the limited capacity to pay housing amortization fees. In Southville 5A, the travel distance to
and from work motivated some residents to consider rental arrangements closer to their work place.
Table 17: Amortization conditions considered affordable (qualitative module)
Research Site
Malaban, Binan (Laguna)
Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija)
Dona Imelda (Quezon City)
KV1 (Rizal)

Southville 4 A
San Fabian (Pangasinan)
Bustos (Bulacan)
Sapang Buho (Nueva Ecija)
GK Camacho Phase II (Marikina)

Amortization rates considered affordable
Php 300 – Php 1,000
Php 500
Php 500/600 to Php 1,400 (higher income bracket); 30 year payment period
Php 250 (1st to 3rd year)
Php 500 (4th year)
Php 825 (until payment is completed)
Overall cost of housing unit – Php 165,000
Current NHA amortization scheme was considered affordable, however, only 40
percent of residents make regular payments
Similar amortization conditions as in KV1. Similarly few households are reported
to make regular payments
Php 250 – Php 1,000; 25 year payment period
Php 500 to Php 1,000
Php 400 to Php 500
Php 200 – 500 (Current amortization rates considered affordable)
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5.4 Community recommendations

Except for the high amortization rates, communities considered that ―in-city‖ resettlement would enable
households in need of resettlement to retain access to livelihood activities and minimize disruptions to social
life. Where this option was not considered feasible, communities stressed the importance of providing access
to basic services in ―off-city‖ resettlement areas, the need to ensure access to livelihoods and income
generating activities. They further underscored the relevance of conducting environmental assessments of the
proposed sites and to provide adequate information to households prior to resettlement.
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6. Local Governance and Recovery
6.1 Improving the delivery of recovery assistance

As outlined in Section 3 above, none of communities that participated in the study agreed
that the assistance given them had met their medium to longer term recovery needs. The respondents
systematically indicated that relief had played a critical role in helping them cope with the immediate
aftermath of the disasters: ―For those like me whose belongings were really damaged it was not really sufficient but […] In
truth it was a big help as it showed you that even if it is not as big as what you lost, even if your home was washed out, you have
something to start with. At least something to console you after what you lost.‖71 Overall, communities considered that
both capital and appropriately designed livelihood training activities were key elements missing in disaster
recovery, as outlined in Section 3. In addition, housing rehabilitation assistance was deemed insufficient in the
areas visited. Delays in implementing adequate resettlement solutions meant that a significant number of
communities remained in precarious conditions and vulnerable to further instances of flooding (Section 4).
Receiving assistance often involved a significant waiting period for affected households: “It is a long process and
there are a lot of requirements”72
Key actors: MSWDO and local leadership
Communities systematically highlighted the role played by the Municipal Social Welfare
Development Officer (MSWDO) in the distribution of goods and services during recovery. The large
number of affected households in targeted sites placed a significant burden placed on MSWDO and on the
limited (human and financial) resources at the LGU level. MSWDOs played a number of critical roles,
including dealing with issues of resettlement post-disaster and supporting the establishment of Homeowners
Associations where relevant73. MSWDO often acted as intermediaries between the municipal/city
government and international funders (sometimes even initiating the cooperation) and played a critical role in
the targeting of assistance and in monitoring the quality of housing and support provided.
Given this multiplicity of roles, being able to rely on community-based organizations and
local leaders (including barangay captains, „purok‟ leaders, and heads of homeowners associations)
during recovery was therefore essential. Sites where respondents were satisfied with the distribution of
recovery assistance tended to have put in place targeting systems that involved barangay and municipal city
officers in collaboration with civil society or community-based organizations. In these cases, communitybased mechanisms were used to identify recovery needs.74 This was observed by the research team in Baliuag,
Bulacan, where women community leaders were instrumental in surveying damage done to houses and
identifying families who were eligible for ―in city‖ resettlement. Their involvement extended to visiting
families after relocation to assess the support provided. A similar approach was reported in Botolan,
Zambales, where staff from the MWSDO coordinated the provision of support to families in temporary
Bustos, Bulacan
Doña Imelda, Quezon City
73 This was observed in Baliuag and La Trinidad.
71
72
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accommodation with local leaders. The latter provided critical information on the most affected households
and their needs. Additional resources provided by national governments and/or development partners were
therefore channeled to communities through local leadership structures. A similar approach was noted in San
Fabian, Pangasinan, where local leaders played a critical part in targeting assistance:“ For example, when our area
gets flooded, we will receive relief goods from the office of the mayor… we will first check who should be given, the indigents. Those
who really need it. We screen out those who are somewhat better off.‖
This reliance on community targeting is, however, likely to have put less organized or
cohesive communities at a disadvantage (as outlined in the initial SIA findings of 2009). Less wellconnected sub-groups within the affected areas, or households who did not belong to community-based
organizations, may have been at greater risk of being left out in the distribution of assistance. Urban
communities, where community-based organizations (CBOs) tend to rally members around specific issues,
were more likely to have the type of CBO that can reach out to a broad spectrum of affected households,
across sub-groups (Figure 21). It is also important to note that it was not uncommon for CBOs in research
sites to be aligned with particular political groups at barangay and municipal level. The research team found
isolated cases where changes at the level of the local administration had resulted in parallel changes in the
roles played by some CBOs. This was the case for example in KV1, where CBOs aligned with the previous
administration now have a less prominent role in health, livelihood and child-care activities, having been
―replaced‖ in some of these functions by other organizations.

Targeting of assistance
In 9 of the 19 study sites, respondents revealed that the system put in place for the provision
of recovery assistance had led to inequitable outcomes. Resources made available during the recovery
phase were described as insufficient to provide support to all those affected. In these areas, there were reports
of particular sections of the community or sub-groups being excluded. In Rosales, Pangasinan, assistance had
primarily been given to households who relocated, with less support available for those who stayed behind:
“Assistance was concentrated in Balingkanaway but we needed help also. All of us were affected.” There was also a sense in
these sites that support had been extended to undeserving households: “There were those who were not given and
there were those who received more than once.”75 ―They choose whom they like to give to. They don‟t realize that the people they
are helping are rich”.[…] “ Yes, there are some that got more than their allotment.” 76
Interestingly, while respondents acknowledged that some households had been more severely
affected than others they were reluctant to draw the conclusion that some sub-groups would therefore require
and deserve higher levels of support to deal with their losses. Fair distribution was considered equivalent in
some sites to providing an equal amount of support (irrespective of the damage incurred): “It would be good if
they would treat everyone fairly. Everyone should be given because everyone suffered during the disaster.” (Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija); “Those living on higher areas of the barangay did not get assistance. The thing is, whether you were affected or not, all
should have been given assistance because everyone‟s farmland was destroyed.” (Sapang Buho, Nueva Ecija)

75
76

Baliuag, Bulacan
Rosales, Pangasinan
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The fact that the decision-making process through which resources are ultimately allocated to or
withheld from affected households is not made known to the community is likely to contribute to this
perception of inequitable distribution of scarce resources: “ […] Officials here go from house to house listing names
for assistance. When the time comes for claiming the assistance, you don‟t see your name on the list. Of course, you get hurt
because of that! They list your name but when the distribution comes, your name disappears? Those who create the list remove
your name and put the names of their own relatives.” (Sapang Buho, Nueva Ecija).
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Figure 21: Issues with the delivery of recovery assistance (number of sites)

Limited access to information
Lack of information both about the targeting process and about the existing programs and
sources of assistance was consistently observed. Respondents considered that differences in access
to information partly explained the uneven distribution of support: “Being ordinary citizens we do not know
who to approach.”77 Participants reported that not everyone was informed about the recovery programs
implemented in the community, with some respondents finding out about existing programs because they
responded to meetings called by the barangay/organization concerned or were sought out by groups
providing support. For others, information about recovery programs arrived too late: “Anyone could apply. The
application is no longer available78”
Respondents in affected areas often highlighted what they considered to be a “monopoly of
knowledge” by community leaders. The way in which information about the support available circulated
in affected areas seemed, therefore, to be highly reliant on personal networks with no instances reported of
LGU putting in place outreach or communication strategies: ―There was a list, I was not yet able to have my name
included in the list because I did not know who was making it. My neighbors told me to go to church… someone who knew where
I lived has my name listed at the church. I was able to get pots, pans. When I was carrying these on my way home some of my
neighbors it turned out had not been able to receive any, they were angry at us. My neighbors were very angry, asking why I got
these and they didn‟t. When the one who made the list went to the area, they cursed the person.79 LGU staff responsible for
the delivery of assistance, on the other hand, reported a great deal of difficulty in explaining the targeting
process to potential beneficiaries: “I find it a big challenge, really, to be explaining to the community the conditions of the
help offered to them, most especially if the assistance will not cover all vulnerable families and we have to select the most vulnerable
ones; there arises conflict among the leaders and the residents.‖ 80

Doña Imelda, Quezon City
Tublay Benguet
79 Bustos, Bulacan
80 Rosales, Pangasinan
77
78
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Limited access to information also meant that respondents were unable to voice their
complaints or grievances about the recovery process: “If there is a complaint, where does one go? We don‟t
complain because there is no one to complain to.” (Malaban, Laguna)
Personalization of assistance
The research team found a number of instances where the provision of recovery assistance was
highly personalized, continuing the trend observed with the provision of relief in the SIA. When
external assistance was lacking, local leaders became the source of support. In eight communities, there were
instances in which a local government official (e.g. barangay captain, members of the Barangay Council, and
the mayor), responding to the needs of his or her community, used personal funds for relief and recovery
assistance.81 These ―out of pocket‖ forms of assistance ranged from providing a regular vehicle to bus
children to and from the evacuation site and school, provision of temporary shelter and other cash donations
and loans.
The majority of gaps in the provision were not considered by the communities to be politically
motivated. However, the research team did find some instances where the distribution of assistance
in the recovery phase could be linked to electoral bids by local politicians:
―One thing is that, during that time, election time is near, so there is a possibility that one who is vying for an office will say,
„I‟ll grant you a house but you have to vote for me,‟ or „I‟ll give you a house, vote me.‟ Now, when this politician did not win, the
house was taken back, they are giving it to another person…” 82
“Some even ask „do you vote here?‟ Is that even fair?”83
“Before Ondoy, upgrading of Pepay Compound was already done, in 2011 it was upgraded again. A concrete pathwalk was
constructed in Orchids Street and Gumamela. Almost all alleys were upgraded before 2010 election. If it was not election related,
the construction should have been done right after Ondoy”84

This was noted in three urban communities (Palayan City, Nueva Ecija and Maybunga, Pasig City); and five rural
communities (La Trinidad, Benguet; Santa, Ilocos Sur; Rosales and San Fabian, Pangasinan; Botolan, Zambales).
82 La Trinidad, Benguet
83 Rosales, Pangasinan
84 Wawa, Taguig
81
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6.2 Disaster preparedness

Greater awareness of disaster risk
In 12 of the study sites, recurrent flooding has resulted in a certain degree of acceptance of
floods as part of daily life. However, the research team observed that in 17 of the 19 communities85
visited there was a greater awareness of the dangers of flooding and of possible mitigation measures
following Ondoy and Pepeng: “Yes. There is a difference between the typhoons now and the typhoons in the past because
people did not expect what happened during Pepeng”86. Mass media (TV and radio) and schools (for children and
young people) were the sources of information about disaster prevention consistently mentioned. There were
also isolated instances where written materials provided by the municipality or the barangay were referred to
as a useful sources of information (in two of the 19 areas covered).87 In these areas, the research team
observed that respondents were aware of a general disaster response plan (―may sistema”).
In addition, increased awareness has led to a few community-based disaster prevention
initiatives with the involvement of local governments (Figure 22). However, these covered a small
number of sites (four of 19 covered by the SIM) and were not comprehensive or linked to wider city or
municipal efforts. While residents in Wawa (Taguig) and Baliuag (Bulacan) were reported to be more vigilant
about waste disposal: “They became more prepared and do not throw their trash here and there that much.”88 They did not
also benefit from a well functioning public address system.89
Figure 22: Improved disaster preparedness (number of sites)

In all research sites with the exception of Santa Rosa, Laguna and Cabatanuan,(Nueva Ecija
Tublay, Benguet
87 San Idelfonso, Bulacan and Doña Imelda, Quezon City
88 Baliuag, Bulacan
89 In place in GK Camacho Phase II, Marikina, Palayan City and Cabanatuan City (Nueva Ecija)
85
86
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Barangay and community level disaster preparedness measures need further strengthening
The absence of a more comprehensive approach to Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management (DRR/M) at community level is likely to be partly connected to the uneven progress with
the roll-out of Municipal and Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (MDRRMC and
BDRRMC) in the research area. These structures intended to play a coordination role of DRR/M activities
were present or in the process of being established in 13 of the 19 study sites. Of these, 11 sites reported the
existence of a disaster preparedness plan in their barangays. Importantly, while training on disaster
preparedness had been implemented by LGUs and nongovernmental organizations in 15 of the study sites,
these tended to focus on LGU officials, with limited outreach observed to the community level.
Table 18: Overview of M/BDRRMC establishment in study sites
Site

MDRRMC

Tublay, Benguet

Rural and peri-urban
- Created after Ondoy/Pepeng (2010)

Baliuag, Bulacan

- Created
- Meet regularly
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- Conducts orientation meetings
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng

Bustos, Bulacan
San Ildefonso, Bulacan
Naguilian, La Union

- Established,
- DRR/M plan in place according to key
informants
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- Established
- Meets regularly during typhoon season

San Fabian, Pangasinan
Rosales, Pangasinan
Botolan, Zambales

Caudillio, Nueva Ecija

Urban
- Established
- Respondents not aware of any DRR/M
plan; no consultation with the
community
- No information available

Maybunga, Pasig City

- Established

Doña Imelda, Quezon City

- Established
- DRR/M plan at city level but not
known at barangay level
- Being established at the time of the
assessment
- Being established at the time of the
assessment

Camacho
Phase
Marikina City

Montalban, Rizal
Wawa, Taguig City

II,

BDRRMC
- Functioning;
- Seminars and trainings held
- Residents unaware of structure or purpose
but generally know of a ―plan‖
- Functioning
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- Lack of awareness of plan among
community
- Established,
- DRR/M plan in place according to key
informants
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- None
- Research participant unaware of council or
plan
- Established
- Respondents not aware of any DRR/M
plan; no consultation with the community
- Established,
- No DRR/M plan
- Functioning and is funded
- A community based DRM Plan exists,
outlining responsibilities of barangay
officials
- No DRR/M plan in place
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng
- BDRRMC exists but has not been
formalized
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6.3 Community recommendations

Both urban and rural communities focused on the importance of strengthening of disaster
preparedness activities in their areas with a focus on the following: (i) acquisition of additional equipment for
relief operations; (ii) provision of disaster preparedness trainings to include the broader community (and not
only local officials); and (iii) establishment of a system for relief/recovery operations, considered lacking in
the majority of sites. Apart from these common interests, urban communities emphasized the need to
implement solid waste management activities in accordance with RA 9003. Rural communities highlighted the
need for infrastructure rehabilitation: (i) rehabilitation of clogged tunnels and eroded mountains, and
reconstruction of seawalls and earth-dikes, and (ii) construction or improvement of facilities (such as an
evacuation centers) and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (roads and canals). Urban communities, which
have been resettled or are anticipating resettlement, recommended that the political-administrative
membership of resettled households (i.e. which barangay they belong to) be clarified before resettlement as it
determines access to public and social services.
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7. Conclusions and research team recommendations
7.1 Main Findings

Limited long-term assistance
Research participants primarily described “relief assistance” when asked about forms of
support they had received. Civil society organizations or government presence was not sustained over time
in communities in need of assistance. Recovery projects, where they were undertaken, were tied to their
sponsors (e.g., political leaders) rather than branded as part of a national recovery program. Communities also
emphasized the “kanya-kanyang kayod” (self-help) aspects of recovery as well as their own personal efforts and
were less aware of the presence of non-governmental actors that provided recovery and reconstruction
support.
Residents in both urban and rural study sites were unclear about which level of government
(barangay, city/municipality, congressional district, province, or national) was responsible for
providing recovery assistance. The SIA highlighted the importance of having close ties with local
governments, or civil society organizations that had better access to resources. With the existence of wellorganized groups within the community, riverine communities in Metro Manila were able to cope better with
the effects of Ondoy than lakeside communities in Laguna did. In the SIM, these linkages were only
important in accessing resources for immediate welfare needs since communities did not actively seek longterm assistance.
What the residents envisioned as long-term assistance were primarily livelihood programs
that would give them a sustainable means of earning income for themselves and their families. As
illustrated in the detailed background reports prepared by the research team in La Trinidad, Benguet; Santa,
Ilocos Sur, Naguilian, La Union; and Botolan, Zambales, the sustainability of livelihood skills training
programs requires that the poor are linked to low-interest loans, raw materials and the labor market.

Providing livelihood skills and knowledge of the market
This model of livelihood training has been successfully implemented by Rags2Riches, a for-profit organization
known for designer bags made of rags by the women residents of Payatas, Quezon City. Rags2Riches provides
the women with product development, marketing, sales, and community development services. It demonstrates
how knowledge of the market and access to holders of such knowledge (e.g. fashion designers, market strategists)
can be tapped to create and implement a business strategy (Saloma-Akpedonu, Jayme-Lao and Advincula-Lopez,
2011).
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Sources of credit and ability to save
The SIM showed that while Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) offered relatively reasonable
interest rates most of the need for credit was answered by private individuals and groups charging
comparatively higher rates. While most of the research participants reported not being able save they
greatly valued their membership in MFIs that incorporate a ―forced savings‖ component in their payment
schemes. Mutual benefit associations, usually affiliates of MFIs, may have the potential to extend savings
capacity among targeted communities by providing the poor with the option of obtaining life insurance90.
One gap that the local governments may be able to fill was the need expressed by
communities to be linked to formal sources of credit. Local government units could serve as guarantors
for loans in certain sectors (e.g., agriculture) in their municipalities or cities. In some LGUs, it would be
important to strengthen the capacity of offices providing livelihood loans (e.g., City Economic Enterprise and
Management Office in Palayan City and Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija) and increase their ability to provide
larger loans. A prerequisite for offering these loans, however, would be to link borrowers to institutions that
could help put sound product development and marketing strategies in place. An equally important condition
would be to change the prevalent attitude that government loans are ―for free‖.
Linking the poor to formal sources of credit
Local government units can learn from the initiatives of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. According to Saloma-Akpedonu, Jayme-Lao,
and Advincula-Lopez (2010):
―[F]armers were oftentimes in debt, and relying on the informal lending system, more commonly known as 5-6, which carried
exorbitant interest rates. To stem the problem, the municipality stepped in, offering 1% interest loans from its own funds in the
amount of P10,000.00 per hectare. These loans are needed to buy fertilizers and seeds. The Municipal Agricultural Officer
points out that the repayment rate is 100%. ―Before we give them a loan, we tell them, ‗You are being helped. But you must
return this help that we will give you so that we can use it again in the future.‘‖
The local government would later be successful in entering into an agreement with the local branch of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, guaranteeing cooperative-backed loans from the bank. The payment schedule of the loan is every six months, timed
after the harvest season. Now, farmers no longer borrow money from the local government; they now do so through the bank
with the same repayment rate of 100%. While assisting farmers in procuring necessary resources, the loans skirted a short-term
―dole out‖ solution that left the main stakeholders, out of the solution. In the series of intensive consultations, the mayor and
her team also learned that debts incurred by farmers were also a result of family health emergencies. Ill-timed expenditures
unexpectedly drained farmers‘ resources, which were now funneled towards emergency health care. Attention then turned to the
health care sector, in particular the programs that provided health care for indigent members of the community, and how to
turn existing programs into responsive structures for San Isidro residents who lived beyond reach of adequate healthcare. The
first move was to make farmers members of the Philhealth ng Masa, Philhealth‘s program for its poorer members.‖

90

Interview with Ms. Silvina Antiquira, Program Manager, KASAGANA-KA-MBA, a mutual benefit assistance program
linked with KASAGANAKA, May 31, 2011. For a premium of PhP20.00 per week, an enrolled member and four of
his/her family members, are covered after three years of payment. In case of the member‘s death, his/her family will
receive a death benefit in the amount of Php 100,000.00.
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Governance structures and disasters
Being distant and located in Metro Manila or in regional centers, national government agencies may
be unfamiliar with the actual needs and practices of the local government units. In Scott‘s (1998) concept of
state simplification, the national government (or the State), in an effort to exert more control over its various
units and to manage them better, simplifies many complex systems rendering them easy to administer even
from a distance. Actual practices, however, can never be assumed to always conform to the plans of the
national government.
The results of the SIM indicate that the local government unit is the focal point of action in
the communities. This implies a wide gap between ―facts on paper and facts on the ground‖ (Scott 1998).
There is, therefore, a need to enhance the capacities of those working on the ground (e.g., mayors, barangay
captains, MSWDO) and to strengthen their links to information and resources provided by national
government. Thus, while fifteen of the 19 study sites instituted community-based disaster preparedness and
prevention programs, communities themselves were seeking technical support (e.g., substantive disaster
preparedness training) so that they can launch in-depth preparations. Moreover, the awareness of the
MDRMMC and BDRMMC was found to be uneven. Residents were not generally aware of the institutions
that were or should be put in place at this level to improve disaster response. More organized and long-term
responses are expected from the municipal level but channeled through the barangay. Pro-active MSWDOs
cultivated good relationships with not only the mayor and other municipal level officials (e.g., city engineers,
planning offices, agricultural offices) but also the barangay-level officials and available NGOs and civic
organizations in order to provide a full complement of services when the need arises.
The collective experience of Ondoy and Pepeng seems to have given rise in some areas to
new practices/ordinances that received positive response from citizens. The research team observed a
greater awareness by the communities of the effect of some of their previous habits (waste disposal) in
putting them at greater risk. Laguna‘s ―Bantay Lawa‖ and ―Clean Up Day‖ (Baliuag, Bulacan, and Wawa,
Taguig) were examples of such initiatives. Other possible indicators of increased local government attention
to disaster preparedness initiatives (particularly post-RA 10121) included training of local government
personnel (from the municipal to the barangay level), purchase of new equipment, and increased information
dissemination campaigns, particularly at the household level. It is, however, still unclear whether or not the
community level DRR/M structures are functional and sustainable, as they remain mostly untested.
The role of the MSWDO remained crucial both in day-to-day and crisis operations. This was
further strengthened by both RA 7160 (An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991) and RA
10121 (An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, Providing for
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and Institutionalizing the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes). On
one hand, the former ―transformed the DSWD from being the main, direct service provider of basic services
to an enabler or provider of technical assistance and augmenter of funds‖ (Aldaba, 2008:3). It also
established a direct working relationship between the MSWDO, the Mayor and other local officials.
According to Aldaba (2008:5):
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―The devolution of social welfare services has been in most respects the “success story” of decentralization. The DSWD
willingly and aggressively managed the devolution of its personnel. DSWD personnel were typically well respected by
local executives and readily absorbed into local organizational structures. Overall in the first five years of devolution, the
changeover process went well. Services continued to be delivered without too many difficulties.‖
The RA 10121 (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010), on the other hand, assigned to
the MSWDO, the role of member in the MDRRMC (Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management
Council). In most cases, the MDRRMC sees the MSWDO in a key implementation role, under the mayor
who chairs the MDRRMC. Under both laws, the MSWDO plays an indispensable role in both the planning
and delivery of necessary goods and services. Due to the devolution of the Office of the MSWDO, the
relationship between mayor and MSWDO can be an interesting case study on how to provide assistance in
politicized domain, particularly in areas where patronage-based bonds remain a crucial dynamic in local
politics. Moreover, the effectiveness of the delivery of social services in the communities is very much
dependent on the ability of the MSWDO to mobilize and manage resources.

7.2 Suggested Strategies for Change

Local government units and National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council
In requiring local government units to put in place a disaster risk reduction and management plan, the
NDRRMC should provide the necessary technical assistance and monitoring system that will enable local
government units to develop plans appropriate or responsive to local conditions and needs. The NDRRMC,
in cooperation with the local government units, could play a significant part by:




Actively leading in the implementation of RA 10121, in particular, strengthening ongoing efforts to
prepare or update the Comprehensive Development Plan of local government units, integrating
disaster risk reduction and management plan into this development plan, and using the calamity fund
to build capacity building for disaster preparedness
Sharing good practices in disaster preparedness such as those that evolved in Davao City and in
Legazpi City in Albay

The NDRRMC could respond to the need expressed in the communities to participate in disaster prevention
and adaptation by:
•
•

Developing awareness of the BDRRMC and the MDRRMC particularly at the level of the barangay,
and establishing systems to extend disaster preparedness training to the household level
Involving the residents and homeowners associations not only in the implementation of disaster risk
reduction and management programs but also in barangay-level planning of such programs for
better ownership and sustainability
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Local government units and the Department of Social Welfare and Development
The SIA and the SIM highlighted the indispensable role of both the barangay and municipal/city governance
units. The DSWD‘s support for the role of the local government units could be strengthened:
•
•
•

•

Improving the MSWDO‘s and LGU‘s procedures to identify vulnerable groups and their relief and
recovery needs
Further build MSWDO capacity and creating further opportunities to share local experiences
Establishing a communication strategy to further develop financial literacy and responsible
borrowing practices [e.g., importance of full repayment, especially of government loans such as the
Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran (SEA-K) Program]
Linking the poor in the communities to MFIs/MBAs which are providing credit, savings, and risk
protection

Local government units and the Department of Interior and Local Government
Made aware of the direct link between flooding and the lack of a proper solid waste management, some
communities have started to implement barangay ―clean up‖ programs. Laws that put these individual efforts
within the wider context of solid waste management and disaster planning are in existence. The DILG and
the local government units could help in the institutionalization of disparate community efforts by:


Monitoring the implementation of RA 9003 and RA 10121

The resettlement of communities to other barangay and municipality or city also highlights the role of local
government units in the provision of basic services and facilities. The DILG could ensure that resettlement
would not disrupt the poor‘s access to basic services by:



Addressing medium- and long-term governance issues in communities which have been
administratively re-defined by resettlement
Clarifying communities‘ entitlements in terms of service delivery so that social services will not be
presented or perceived as personal acts of generosity by specific officials

Local government units, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and National Disaster
Risk Reduction Management Council
The SIM shows flooding and landslide are a recurrent experience in many communities. This means that
evacuation is a constant exercise in these communities. Agencies tasked to plan for such eventualities could
lessen the impact of staying in temporary shelters by:
•

Organizing physical spaces in evacuation centers to ensure safety, particularly of women and
children: Spaces in evacuation centers where molestation and physical attacks are known to happen
(e.g., toilets, unlit areas, grassy areas, back of buildings) must be well-constructed, well-lighted,
guarded, or made visible to public view
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Making projections on the number of evacuees and allocating adequate space for each, if relocation
and resettlement are not feasible

Local government units, Technical Skills Development Authority, Department of Science and
Technology, and Department of Trade and Industry
The SIM shows that communities expect governmental response in the form of sustainable livelihood
assistance. However, it also points out that many members of the affected communities are unskilled.
TESDA, DOST and DTI could create a market for the products and the skills of the poor by:


Establishing partnerships between the local government units/government agencies and the private
sector/NGOS by, on the one hand, apprising corporations, groups, and individuals of communities
in need and, on the other, bringing knowledge of the market and technological innovation (e.g., what
will sell to which groups, what skills are needed by which enterprise, what existing innovations could
be introduced to products and services),

Local government units, Department of Public Works and Highways, and Department of Social
Welfare and Development
The situation in rural areas and the consequent demand for infrastructure rehabilitation to mitigate and adapt
to natural disasters highlight that certain community needs can only be addressed by the national government.
The DPWH, DSWD, and the local government units could promote suitable responses by:



Supporting recovery efforts and assistance that are primarily large-scale infrastructure projects aimed
at keeping communities safe: seawalls, dikes, dams, ripraps, evacuation centers, and resettlement sites
Making information about disaster prone provinces and areas in the country accessible to concerned
citizens, and in the absence of existing data, conducting a technical study to determine whether in any
affected community, relocation and resettlement should be done instead of undertaking
infrastructure projects (e.g., seawalls, dikes, dams, ripraps) and vice versa

Local government units, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the National Housing
Authority
The results of the SIM emphasize the advantages of ―in-city‖ resettlement, even as they also underline the
difficulties brought about by its relatively higher amortization rate; the lack of mechanisms that enables
government planners and implementers to consider the needs of communities to be resettled; and the
inadequacy of the existing information and communication system. The NHA, DSWD, and the local
government units could address these gaps by continuing to:


•

Improve the system for apprising prospective resettlement clients of the payment scheme of housing
units, the location and facilities available in the resettlement site, and the presence/absence of
environmental risks in the site
Find ways to provide in-city resettlement options. The Maybunga Housing project of Pasig City, is
one example of how local government units can respond to housing needs. In contrast, the
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•



resettlement site in Calib-Ungan in Botolan, Zambales, which is located on a mountain some distance
from the town center, needs further planning in the provision of electricity, water, public
transportation, and livelihood opportunities
Devise ways to offer more affordable amortization schemes (e.g. partnership with the private sector
and civil society organizations). As confirmed by the survey in Eusebio Bliss, residents in in-city
resettlement sites have difficulties in paying the amortization of their units, as these are likely to be
the more costly medium- and high-rise buildings
Consider the findings of recent studies (e.g., the Post-Disaster Community Profiling and Mapping
Project‖ conducted by the John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues for Partnership of
Philippine Support Services Agencies, Inc. (PhilSSA), and the ―Housing Preferences and
Affordability Assessment‖ that UP PLANADES undertaken in Taguig for AusAID.

Page 80 of 80

REFERENCES

Published/unpublished works
Institute of Philippine Culture. 2010. Rapid Assessment of the Social Impacts of Tropical Storm Ondoy on
Urban Poor Communities. Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture.
John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues. 2011. Post-Disaster Community Profiling and Mapping Project.
Putnam, Robert. The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life‖. The American Prospect 13. 35-42
Saloma-Akpedonu, Czarina, Melissa Jayme-Lao and Leslie Advincula-Lopez. 2011. ―How Communities and
Networks Generate Change.‖ Defining Filipino Leadership. Eds. Assunta Cuyegkeng and Antonette PalmaAngeles. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 181-192.
2010. What Works? Studying the Nature and Dynamics of Social Change in the Philippines. Final Report
(Unpublished).
Scott, James. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.
New Haven: Yale University
UP Planning and Development Research Foundation, Inc. (UP PLANADES). N.d. Socioeconomic Survey of
Households Living in the High-Risk Areas of Taguig City.
World Bank. 2009. Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng Social Impact Assessment, Luzon Site Reports (manuscript).
Websites
www.dswd.gov.ph/phocadownload/swdjournal08/dswdjournalvol.22april-june.pdf. Accessed on June 20,
2011.
http://www.ndcc.gov.ph/attachments/045_RA%2010121.pdf. Accessed on June 21, 2011.
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2009/Presentation_RAVirola.pdf. Accessed on August 9, 2011.
http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf. Accessed on June 23, 2011.
http://www.disasterassessment.org/section.asp?ID=22. Accessed on June 23, 2011.

